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Abstract
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The supersession of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union
(AU) in 2002 marked a paradigm shift in African international relations. While the OAU
had become known as a talking shop that failed to foster integration, the AU was
established with a revived commitment to African unity. This thesis examines what
lessons the European Union has to offer for African integration and the achievements and
shortcomings of the AU. I find that its legal and institutional framework displays an
ambitious commitment to integration, development, and democratization but that the AU
suffers from functional problems that delay implementation.
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Introduction
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Africa can and will only advance through African integration, which can be
realized through the Federal United States of Africa.


Cheikh Anta Diop

I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in
their efforts to solve the problems of this continent. I dream of our vast deserts, of
our forests, of all our great wildernesses.


Nelson Mandela

One of the achievements of our bloodstained century if it may be called an
achievement, is so clearly to have revealed the two faces of nationalism: its
capacity for enlarging freedom, and its potential for destroying freedom.


Basil Davidson

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2001 and its subsequent
inauguration in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 marked a paradigm shift in African
international relations. The AU’s predecessor organization, the Organization for African
Unity (OAU) had been established in 1963 with the promotion of unity and solidarity
among African states, the improvement of the lives of African peoples, the defense of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, the eradication of all forms of
colonialism in Africa, as well as the intensification of international cooperation as its
objectives.1 Of these, it succeeded in achieving the liberation of the continent from

1

Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, Art. 2.1.
1

colonialism and apartheid, as well as the protection of national sovereignty of member
states, but has come under criticism for its dismal performance with regards to its other
objectives. It came to be known as an organization that accommodated the interests of
national governments but failed to address the challenges which its member states and
their peoples faced during the years of its existence. The end of the Cold War, the
successive victory against apartheid, and the beginning of the dismantling of authoritarian
regimes across Africa during the 1990s fostered hope for political and economic
transformation on the continent. Thus, at the turn of the twentyfirst century, a group of
African leaders sought to revive the ideology of PanAfricanism and give new
momentum to Kwame Nkrumah's vision for a united African continent. Lead by Thabo
Mbeki of South Africa, these leaders, among whom were Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria,
Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, AbdulAziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Joachim Chissano of
Mozambique, and Alpha Oumar of Mali, envisioned a future in which African states
would reduce their dependence on external aid and intervention and collectively establish
the continent as a major player in global governance.2 These leaders saw integration as
the core prerequisite for developing African solutions to African problems and for
gaining influence internationally. Through the pooling of sovereignty and harmonization
of policies, they argued, African countries would increase their bargaining power
vis
à
vis the rest of the world, and accelerated economic integration would moreover
boost development by unleashing the benefits of enlarged domestic markets. While at

Sabelo J. NdlovuGatsheni, “PanAfricanism and the international system,” in
Handbook of Africa’s International Relations
, ed. Tim Murithi (London: Routledge,
2014), 26.
2

2

first, OAU members committed to a review of the OAU Charter to assess whether
changes should be made to the organization in order to foster closer integration under the
OAU framework and what the nature of such changes would be, the slow pace of said
review propelled member states to create a new organization altogether.3 At the Fourth
Extraordinary Session of the OAU in 1999, they adopted the Sirte Declaration, which
announced, inter alia, the establishment of the African Union, accelerated economic
integration, and the planned drafting and adoption of a constitutive legal text for the new
union.4 The entry into force of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the Constitutive
Act) in May 2001 following the establishment of the AU in March of the same year made
manifest the desire to deepen continental integration in Africa. The Constitutive Act
provides for new institutions that the OAU had lacked, namely the African Court of
Justice, the PanAfrican Parliament (PAP), and the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOCC), which have been designed to allow for a more democratic union through
the engagement of civil society. It additionally reflects a paradigm shift with regards to
the norms of state sovereignty and noninterference that were enshrined in the OAU
Charter. By endowing the AU with the power to intervene in member states in grave
circumstances as well as in the event of an unconstitutional change of government, the
Constitutive Act counters the reluctance to get involved in the domestic affairs of
member states in extraordinary circumstances that had previously predominantly defined

Tiyanjana Maluwa, “The Transition from the Organization of African Unity to the
African Union,” in 
The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework 
ed.
Abdulqawi A Yusuf and Fatsah Ouguergouz
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,

2012), 30.
4
Sirte Declaration, September 9, 1999.
3
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African international relations since independence. African leaders created a continental
organization that raised hopes domestically, continentally, and globally.
The revived vision for an African transformation through PanAfrican unity that
had lead to the establishment of the AU arose in response to two fundamental challenges
affecting African states, one old and one new. The old challenge is that of
underdevelopment and undevelopment, while the new challenge is that of globalization.
Underdevelopment and undevelopment in many ways, albeit not entirely, relate to
the legacy of colonialism on the continent. With few notable exceptions, such as
Botswana, the hopes for development that had characterized the independence era had
not materialized throughout much of Africa by the end of the Cold War. Although the
OAU Charter listed among its objectives the improvement of the lives of African people,
development remained a predominantly domestic policy area that was carried out through
stateled approaches and paired in many places with destructive nationalist projects.
Together with the OAU’s doctrine of strict noninterference in the domestic affairs of
member states, these policies frequently resulted in economic stagnation at best and
decline at worst.
Exemplary of these trends were the disastrous attempts at villagization through
resettlement in Ethiopia in the 1980s, as well as the economic decline in Zaire, today the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), under Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule between 1965
and 1997. The DRC in many ways represents the most acute example of the particular
developmental challenges affecting many African countries after independence. The

4

legacy of brutal colonization by Belgium, paired with low levels of precolonial
production during the Kingdom of Kongo in which the economy was based on slave trade
and resource extraction, produced extractive political and economic institutions that
continued to exist after independence.5 Corruption, capital flight and conflict became
widespread, preventing productive accumulation and investment in the provision of
public goods. Despite being one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural
resource abundance, between 1965 and 1997 real GDP per capita in the DRC as
measured in constant 2005 US Dollars fell from $742.3 to $254.1, and further to $206.6
by 2000.6 Moreover, much of the country is affected by undevelopment, as vast areas are
out of the reach of existing infrastructure and state power. At the same time, much of the
known resource wealth of the DRC has been and continues to be exploited to the benefit
of foreign firms and small local elites, leading to the generalized high vulnerability
reflected in the decline of the material standard of living as shown by the falling GDP per
capita.7
The DRC may constitute an extreme case of failed development on the African
continent, but its fate is instructive to the understanding of the challenges of
undevelopment and underdevelopment in Africa. In addition to underdevelopment, that
is, the exploitation of local resources for the benefit of foreign powers and
undevelopment, i.e., the failure to capitalize on known and yet undiscovered resources,

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty 
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 88.
6
“Democratic Republic of Congo,” World Bank, accessed December 20, 2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc.
7
Ibid.

5
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colonialism meant that African states were integrated into the global economy on the
terms of the colonizers. This frequently resulted in the economies of African states being
based on the export of a handful or less primary commodities for consumption and
valueadded manufacturing in the West. As a result, many African economies became
vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices and lack the kind of diversification
of production that reduces such vulnerabilities. Colonialism, moreover, had as a
consequence that, with only few exceptions, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan,
African countries did not take part in the processes that created global cooperation and
integration regimes at the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN), and under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because these regimes were
negotiated before the majority of African states had gained sovereignty, they
disproportionately institutionalized Western interests. At independence, African states,
like other formerly colonized countries, thus started out from a disadvantaged position on
the global political and economic playing field.
At the time of the transformation of the OAU into the AU, the failure of African
states

to

single handedly deal with the challenges of undevelopment and

underdevelopment had become apparent. Member states had sought to collectively
address the problems relating to development in Africa at least since the 1980
OAUbacked Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (The Lagos
Plan of Action). The Lagos Plan of Action aimed to increase the selfsufficiency of
African economies and to better the terms of international trade, specifically with the
West, for African countries. This ultimately failed to be implemented, as the World Bank

6

published the Berg Report in response taking a radically different approach to African
development than the Lagos Plan. Instead of increased selfsufficiency, it advocated for
further trade liberalization and unlike the OAU document, it blamed African leaders, not
the international community, for Africa’s dismal economic situation. These developments
intensified the negotiations for deepening continental integration which ultimately
resulted in the creation of the AU.
The second, and more recent, challenge confronting African states is that of
globalization. Traces of globalization are ubiquitous in today’s world. Multinationals
like the Coca Cola Company have devised clever mechanisms to market their products to
even the most remote corners of the globe, and the falling costs and increasing
availability of communications and information technology continue to decrease the
barriers to the creation and maintenance of social relationships that are both local and
distant. Simultaneously, four decades of neoliberal economic policy have brought about
the continuous integration of national markets into the global capitalist economy through
increased international flows of goods, services, capital and labor. In an increasingly
interconnected world with said globalizing processes at play, states are often caught
between domestic and international demands. On the one hand, the twentieth century and
the first two decades of the twentyfirst century have tended toward international
integration. On the other hand, protectionism among nations states has risen, especially in
the aftermath of the Great Recession,8 and popular support for integration efforts has
begun to decline in many places. The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed

8

Andrew Jones,


Globalization: Key Thinkers 

(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 11.

7

the emergence of a multiplicity of regional economic and political integration agreements
in addition to the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. While the European Union (EU) is certainly the
most prominent example among these as the most integrated regional organization to
date, regional political and economic integration is a priority on the foreign relations
agenda of many states worldwide. Examples include the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in Latin
America, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Across the diverse and rapidly decolonizing African continent, the desire for
continental unity manifested itself first in the creation of the OAU in 1963 and later in its
transformation into the AU in 2002. Because of the aforementioned failure of the OAU to
achieve the kind of integration that would allow its member states to collectively confront
the challenges that globalization and development posed, and to increase their influence
in global affairs, member states began to seek new ways to foster integration. The 1990
Declaration on the Political and SocioEconomic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental
Changes Taking Place in the World announced that OAU member states believed that the
forces of globalization were affecting Africa and that the precarious political and
socioeconomic situation on the continent should be addressed through integration that
would foster peace and enhance development. Ultimately, the AU was established to give
new momentum to the aspirations to find solutions to the challenges of development and
globalization that had not been found at the OAU.

8

While in the light of continuing globalization, this kind of regionalism is often
viewed as a mechanism to advance the interests of countries within a given geographic
region in global governance,9 the AU so far appears to have displayed a limited impact on
global international relations in the fourteen years of its existence despite the ambitious
agenda that had lead to its inception. In addition, the African continent continues to face
challenges that affect the performance of the AU and its constituent regional economic
communities (RECs), raising the question whether there can be meaningful advances in
economic and political integration in Africa as long as peace, stability, democratization,
and development do not advance.
Against this broad backdrop, this thesis examines the state of the African Union in
the context of globalization and analyzes the reasoning for, and challenges to, African
regional and continental integration vis
à
vis the rest of the world. It seeks to answer the
following questions:
● What are the imperatives for, and obstacles to, further integration at the AU?
● What lessons can the European integration experience provide for the AU?
● What are the achievements of African regional and continental integration to
date?
● What are the prospects for future integration in Africa?

In order to answer these questions, I first review the pivotal concepts related to this study
in Chapter 1. Secondly, I provide an overview of the history of international integration

Arie Kakowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent,
Divergent, or Overlapping?,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political24(4) (1999): 530,
doi: 10.177/030437549902400405.
9

9

in Africa in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses the question whether European integration
can or should serve as a model for integration in Africa. It considers the similarities and
differences between the EU and AU, assesses the achievements and shortcomings of
European integration, and, finally, outlines the lessons that the European experience has
to offer for the AU. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the achievements and
shortcomings of the AU. Based on these four chapters, I assess the prospects for future
integration on the African continent under the AU framework in the concluding chapter.
This work is based in part on interviews with experts on African integration
conducted in Brussels and elsewhere during 2014. I conducted this while working on an
independent research project on comparative regionalization in Africa and Europe during
a semester of study abroad in The Hague, the Netherlands.. I approached potential
informants, who included diplomats, academics and consultants, via email. I obtained
interviews with an expert scholar researching the AU, as well as an African diplomat who
formerly worked for the OAU, and at the time of interviewing held a diplomatic post in
Brussels. The bulk of the other interviews used in this study were conducted in Addis
Ababa in the summer of 2015. During this time, I was granted access to the AU
headquarters, where I had opportunities to talk with permanent AU staff in various
divisions. I moreover had the chance to interview diplomatic staff working in Addis
Ababa. While I sought to obtain interviews with staff from the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA), as well as the PanAfrican Chamber of Commerce
(PACCI), I was not able to secure appointments at these organizations while in Addis
Ababa. All of my informants requested that I treat their identity with confidentiality.

10

Chapter 1.
Concepts: A Literature Review
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1.1.

Introduction
Any comprehensive study of international integration in Africa ought to consider

the theoretical frameworks and historical context that inform the present of the AU.
Otherwise, one risks mistaking the present condition of African integration as ahistorical
and therefore overlooking the processes that have shaped its present state, as well as the
underlying causes of some of the challenges it faces. Before turning to the specific
history of international integration in Africa, this chapter discusses the five main concepts
that inform this study of international integration in Africa. These are: globalization,
integration, the state, power, and, finally, development. Below I review these concepts in
relation to integration in Africa, and relate them to the African continent in general where
appropriate.

1.2.

Globalization
The concept of globalization provides the overarching conceptual framework on

which this study is based. Globalization has been on everyone’s lips since at least since
the 1990s, yet it represents one of the "most used but also one of the most misused ... and

11

confused words around today."10 The globalization debate began to blossom in the late
1980s, when it was identified as a driver of social change worldwide by scholars such as
Anthony Giddens and David Harvey.11 Globalization scholarship has since evolved in
different directions and within various scholarly disciplines, but with a general trend
toward the defense of globalization arising during the 2000s, simultaneous with the
emergence of antiglobalization movements in global civil society.12 Although the debate
about globalization remains relevant and heated, and a multitude of work has been
published about it, there remains a lack of agreement among scholars and policymakers
alike on what constitutes it. This disagreement about how globalization can be defined is
rooted in part in disciplinary contexts and in part in the epistemological frameworks
employed by scholars of globalization.13 Still, and most broadly, globalization can be
conceptualized as "the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of
society,"14 but scholars in different disciplines provide distinct theories on the causes of
globalization and the processes by which it occurs.
Roland Robertson, Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells provide sociological
perspectives on globalization. According to Robertson, globalization refers to “both the
compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a
whole.”15 These processes involve a movement toward global sociocultural unicity that

Jones, 
Globalization
, 4.
Ibid.
12
Ibid, 10.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, 113.
15
Roland Robertson, 
Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture
(London: Sage,
1992), 8.
10
11

12

diminishes the importance of territorial boundaries in human relations.16 He identifies
four elements that together compose what he terms the global field: nation states,
individuals, international relations, and a consciousness of the common humanity of
people.17 The processes of globalization alter these distinct fields: nationstates become
more internally diverse than they had been at their inception, individuals claim more
complex identities, international relations expand across the entirety of the globe, and the
consciousness of common humanity gives rise to debates on issues such as gender and
sexuality.18 Robertson rejects the idea that globalization has as a consequence the
universalization of world culture. He writes,
the concept of globalization has involved the simultaneity and the interpenetration
of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or  in more abstract
vein  the universal and the particular.19

He thereby captures an important aspect of globalization that is often overlooked, namely
that globalization not only homogenizes the economic, political and social spheres of
societies worldwide, but that it also creates the heterogenization of the latter. In short,
what becomes universalized is the experience of particularity in an increasingly
interconnected world.

William Coleman and Alina Sajed, 
Fifty Key Thinkers on Globalization
(London:
Routledge, 2013), 170.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid, 171.
19
Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, 
Global Modernities
(London:
Sage, 1995), 30.
16
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Giddens has defined globalization as “
the intensification of worldwide social
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”20 To him, globalization represents not
so much a historical rupture that initiated a new epoch, but rather an accelerated
continuation of modernity.21 Modernity, according to Giddens, has produced three
important processes which have radicalized to form globalization. Firstly, it has brought
about the separation of space and time through the introduction of time measurement.
Secondly, social relations have been lifted out of local contexts of time and space. Lastly,
social practices are reconfigured in a reflexive relationship with novel information.22
Giddens, too, identifies four elements of globalization, namely the nationstate system,
world capitalist economy, world military order, and the international division of labor.23
Unlike Robertson’s sociocultural approach, Giddens focuses on institutional effects of
globalization, whereby his four key features of modernity  surveillance, military power,
capitalism, and industrialism  are applied to a global scale to become the aforementioned
four elements of globalization.

Anthony Giddens,
The Consequences of Modernity 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1990), 64.
21
Jones, 
Globalization
, 38.
22
Coleman and Sajed, 
Fifty Key Thinkers on Globalization
, 103.
23
Giddens, 
The Consequences of Modernity
, 71.
20
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To Cas
tells,
globalization is the process by which human activity in its dif
ferent dimensions
becomes selectively and asymmetrically organized in interactive networks of
performance that function on a planetary scale in real time.24

Like that of Robertson and Giddens, Castells’ understanding of globalization thus
involves a change in the relationship between space and time but Castells specifically
identifies the emergence of modern information and communications technology as
globalization’s ultimate cause. He firstly argues that information and communications
technology has shifted the predominant mode of economic production from industrial
capitalism to informational capitalism beginning in the 1970s.25 Although industrial
production continues to exist alongside that of informational capitalism, the latter has
increased the interpenetration of different locales of production.26 Moreover, industrial
capitalism implies an increasing importance of human capital intensive goods in
international trade, which has produced a new global NorthSouth division of labor
between the “knowledgerich” North and the “knowledgepoor” South.27 Castells further
ascribes a pivotal importance to the growing integration of global capital markets,28 and
argues that in the context of informational capitalism, “states shift their attention away
from social protection to promoting competitiveness in the global economy.”29 Secondly,

Manuel Castells, “Globalization, Flows, and Identity: The New Challenges of Design,”
in 
Reflections on Architectural Practice in the Nineties
, ed. William S. Saunders (New
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 198.
25
Coleman and Sajed, 
Fifty Key Thinkers on Globalization
, 54.
26
Ibid, 57.
27
Jones, 

Globalization
, 62.
28
Ibid
.
29
Coleman and Sajed, 
Fifty Key Thinkers on Globalization
, 57.
24
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information and communications technology has created what Castells terms a network
society, whereby horizontal networks of people have gained importance over vertical
organizations and can flexibly operate on a global scale in real time, leading to the
changing of social structures and the reshaping of culture.30
Moving from sociology to the field of economics, Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik
provide alternative frameworks of globalization that also address its implications for
global political economy. Stiglitz defines globalization as
the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been
brought about by the enormous reduction of the cost of transportation and
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods,
services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.31

In his view, globalization is not an inherently good or bad process. Rather, it has been
dominated by powerful developed states that have continued to shape its processes in
ways that are advantageous to them and their corporations, thereby preventing
globalization’s “potential to do enormous good”32 from materializing itself and
alleviating poverty in less developed countries. He further argues that as a result of the
political power of developed states, the global governance institutions regulating the
global economy, primarily the IMF and the World Bank, have become preoccupied with
neoliberal market fundamentalism, alternatively known as the Washington Consensus.33
Based on the assumption that markets are infallible, these institutions adopted neoliberal

Ibid, 59.
Joseph Stiglitz, 
Globalization and its Discontents 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 9.
32
Stiglitz, 
Globalization and its Discontents
, 20.
33
Jones, 
Globalization
, 153.
30
31
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policies towards struggling developing countries that either advocated for, or, in the case
of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), imposed, fiscal austerity, privatization, and
liberalization. Stiglitz argues that fiscal austerity was socially disruptive to the point of
prompting conflict, privatization was carried out too speedily to produce positive effects,
and liberalization was taken too far, so that the development of weak economies was
compromised because a lack of capital and entrepreneurial capacity prevented them from
reaping the potential gains from trade.34 To make globalization work for the world’s poor,
Stiglitz argues, institutions of global economic governance must undergo comprehensive
reform in favor of less developed economies.35
A political economist, Rodrik bridges the disciplinary gap between politics and
economics in the globalization debate. Although Rodrik’s concept of globalization is
based primarily on economic considerations, and he considers capitalism to be
inseparable from globalization,36 his work resonates with Castells’ view that globalization
shifts states’ policy focus outward to competitiveness in the world economy. Rodrik
emphasizes the relationships between states, globalization, and governance. He defines
two types of globalization  “hyperglobalization” and “moderate” globalization  which
can be distinguished by the degree of agency that international trade agreements leave
states with to pursue domestic policies.37 Hyperglobalization is becoming increasingly
more common as the scope of international integration agreements is expanding to
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include domestic policy areas.38 Lastly, Rodrik introduces the model of the political
trilemma of the world economy, according to which of deep international integration, the
state as an independent territorial jurisdiction entity, and democratic mass politics merely
two out of three can be realized at the same time.39
For the purpose of this study, and leaning on the works discussed in this section, I
propose globalization to be the set of continuous economic, political and social processes
that are caused by innovation in communications and information technology and that
have as a consequence the simultaneous homogenization and heterogenization of all
aspects of society.

1.3.

Integration
Integration, also referred to as international integration, most broadly refers to the

process by which states enter into agreements with each other to create policy
cooperation by adopting shared institutions and rules. Although integration can address
any policy area, economic integration has historically been both most common and a
frequent stepping stone towards political and social forms of integration. It can be defined
as “a
n economic arrangement between different regions marked by the reduction or
elimination of trade barriers and the coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policies
.”40
Regional integration may refer to either economic integration or regional political
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cooperation, or both. It must, however, occur between often adjoining states located
within a supranational geographical region, as opposed to across great geographical
distance.
The main theories of international relations, namely neoliberalism, neorealism,
constructivism and neoidealism, do not, or at least not fully, address the concept of
integration, as a result of which particular theories of international integration have
developed.

The bulk of international integration theory originated in the context of

European integration after the Second World War and has subsequently been applied to
other regional contexts. This creates a fundamental theoretical problem for the study of
nonEuropean regional integration,41 since even where scholars acknowledge the
particularities of the region studied, nonEuropean regional integration tends to be
analyzed against the backdrop of the European experience.42 
In the African context, the
characterization of the continent’s integration regimes in comparison to the European
model have frequently lead to the conclusion that they are weak.43 Particularly in the
African context, however, it can be argued that it remains instructive to consult theories
of European integration, given that the AU has been modelled on the EU with regards to
its goals and institutional design.44
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The most prominent among the specifically European theories, in a chronological
order, have been federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, multilevel governance,
and consociationalism. While federalists like Spinelli in the aftermath of World War II
emphasized the need to avoid future war by integrating the governance of otherwise
competing nation states, functionalists such as Mitrany believed that a shared need for
technocratic governance of certain economic and social sectors would create institutions
that in the long run gain legitimacy and promote international governance.45
Neofunctionalist theories of integration, too, emphasize the integration of economic
sectors; however, they add the idea that integrating strategic economic sectors that have a
low political priority will create spillover effects to additional sectors and promote further
institutionalization of integration. More recently, theories of multilevel governance have
introduced the idea that states are not the only actors that link domestic politics and
international governance. Instead, they advance the idea of multilevel policynetworks
that involve states and nonstate actors alike.46 Lastly, advocates of consociationalism
like Lijphart argue that entities with sharp internal divisions can successfully be governed
through powersharing between the elites of contesting groups.47 While Lijphart’s
scholarship focuses mainly on powersharing in divided states, there exist consociational
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interpretations of the European Union48 that can be extended to regional integration
regimes in Africa.
In addition to these Eurocentric theories, three groups of scholars working on
integration globally have emerged more recently.49 On the one hand, the neoliberal and
institutionalist groups continue to employ the state and formal institutional actors as the
primary unit of analysis in the study of integration. Neoliberal theorists, such as Friedrich
von Hayek of the Austrian School and Milton Friedman of the Chicago School, advocate
for the complete liberalization of trade, which they argue would increase overall welfare
by harvesting the gains from trade. To neoliberalists, the creation of regional trade blocs
hence represents the second best scenario to the complete liberalization of world trade,
since barriers to trade continue to exist between them.50 The institutional approaches can
be divided into three broad categories: historical institutionalism, rational choice
institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. First, in historical institutionalism,
development is characterized by path dependency and unintended outcomes, and
historical change is created at critical junctures, such as economic crises.51 Second,
rational choice institutionalism of integration places institutional actors at the center of
analysis, whereby they have fixed preferences and will operate in ways conducive to their
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attainment of the closest approximation of the latter.52 Third, sociological institutionalism
focuses on culture, values, identities, and ideas.53 On the other hand, new regionalism
theory has shifted

analysis away from formal actors and toward ‘informal sectors,

parallel economies, and nonstate coalitions.”54
It is important here to make a conceptual distinction between international
integration that occurs at the global level under the WTO framework, and regional
integration regimes. Regionalism, as it occurs in Africa under the AU framework, 
can be
defined as the tendency toward integration of the societies within a given supranational
region.55 In essence, it can be seen as globalization on a smaller scale and according to
the economic, political and social particularities of the region in question. Regions, in this
sense, can be considered intermediate communities between nation states and the global
community. And while within regions, globalizationlike processes of homogenization
are at play, regionalism may simultaneously create heterogenization at the world scale by
providing regional groupings of states with the opportunity to create communities
vis
à
vis

the

globalizing

capitalist

economy.56

Regions

thereby

exemplify

heterogenization within a homogenizing global context.
More technically, the degree of economic integration between two or more states
is commonly classified in six categories. First, preferential trade agreements constitute
the loosest form of economic integration, and encompass a partial removal of trade
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barriers between member states.57 Second, free trade areas are distinct from preferential
trade agreements in that they entail the removal of all barriers to trade between member
states, but members maintain individual trade policies towards nonmembers.58 Third,
customs unions are free trade agreements with the addition of a common external tariff
towards nonmembers, as well as harmonized external trade policies.59 Fourth, common
markets are customs unions in which the free movement of the factors of production, in
particular capital and labor, is guaranteed.60 Fifth, economic unions display a substantial
coordination of economic policies and some unification of economic institutions in
addition a common market.61 Lastly, the most complete form of economic integration is
the monetary union, in which members adopt a common currency and create a
supranational central bank.62
In terms of institutional design, then, political integration is related to economic
integration not only in that the two usually accompany each other, but also since a
complete political union consists of a monetary union whose members centralize political
institutions and begin to act if not as a quasistate, then at least as a regional bloc.63
Looser forms of political integration exist in the form of international policy cooperation
that is customarily centered around specific policy areas, such as regional security,
human rights, or natural resource governance.
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1.4.

The State
(...) a major distinction between African international relations and those
elsewhere is that so many of Africa’s states are states in name only  legal entities
that have failed to consolidate political power within the territories over which
they are legally recognized authorities.


Douglas Lemke

To understand the dynamics of regional and continental integration in Africa it is
necessary to devote some attention to the concept of the state, as well as the history and
properties of the state in Africa in particular. Much of the literature concerning
postcolonial African politics is centered around an analysis of the state,64 and given the
predominantly interstate/intergovernmental nature of the AU and its constituent RECs,
states continue to play a dominant role in the evolution and implementation of
international integration agreements on the continent. Despite widespread consensus
about the significance of the state for the study of contemporary African politics and
international relations; however, “there is precious little agreement on its conceptual
meaning or the interpretive implications of its analysis.”65 Much like the concept of
globalization, the concept of the state has become so ubiquitous that its meaning is
frequently assumed to be tacitly understood.
The origins of political philosophy concerning institutions of political rule in
human communities can be traced back to antiquity, as can the beginnings of the
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development of the modern state as a particular form of political organization. While
some would advance examples such as the Greek polis or the Asante Empire as evidence
for the worldwide existence of the state before the advent of modernity, Max Weber has
argued that “the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full
development.”66 This suggests that such premodern forms of political organization, even
if they were statelike, lacked certain features that the modern state possesses. It is hence
important to delineate these features and to arrive at a definition that places the concept
of the state in the context of modernity.
Max Weber and Karl Marx provide two prominent theories of the modern state.
Weber famously defined the state as “the form of human community that (successfully)
lays claim to the 
monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.”67
He later added “an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation”68 as a
defining feature of the state. Weber’s work emphasizes the territoriality and legitimacy of
rule, as well as the bureaucratic depersonalization of political power that an institution of
political rule must possess in order to be considered a state. Unlike Weber’s, Karl Marx’s
theory of the state focuses less on the elements that compose a state than on its activities
and purpose. According to Marx, the state is the instrument of political control by the
economically dominant classes69 over the rest of society. The features of a state are thus
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determined by class struggle, which in turn is characterized by the development of the
dominant mode of production of a society.70
Leaning on Weber and Marx, I define the modern state as the legitimate
aggregation of collective power which translates itself into systems of governance over a
particular territory and group of people. This definition includes Weber’s notions of
political legitimacy in the creation of state institutions, and that of the depersonalization
of political power inherent in enduring systems of governance, as well as a Marxian
understanding that the exercise of state power through its systems of governance is
necessarily carried out by a group of people over the rest of society.
The state can then be understood to consist of four distinct but interrelated
elements: a leader, a regime, an administration, and a commonwealth.71 The element of
the leader refers to the individual who is the head of state or government at any given
point in time, a regime consists of the highranking executive officials surrounding the
leader, the administration is composed of positions within a perpetual infrastructure, and
finally, the commonwealth refers to a sense of common belonging, a solidarity between
strangers that transcends networks of kinship.72 The first three elements perform the
functions that the state today is commonly assigned, namely the responsibility to protect,
control over its territory, the legitimate use of violence, the collection of revenue and
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provision of public goods, and the maintenance of general security,73 while the fourth
element serves as a source of legitimacy of the state. Lastly, its performance and
legitimacy constitute the two determinants of the relative strength or weakness of the
state.74
In historical perspective, the modern state has evolved as a form of political
organization in Europe. Although a variety of forms of political organization existed in
precolonial Africa, modern state organization was largely, though not exclusively,
imported to the continent during the era of colonization.75 Thus, conceptions of
Westphalian sovereignty, too, were not widespread in African political systems before
colonization, during which they were central to justifying land grabbing.76 The signing of
the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 ended a number of major wars in Europe and
established the sovereign state as the basic unit of the modern international political
system.77 The Westphalian understanding of sovereignty had at its core the principles of
territorial integrity and strict noninterference in the internal affairs of a state, as well as
the state’s right to exercise external sovereignty, i.e. to enter international agreements
freely and voluntarily.78 In the African context, however, state borders after independence
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reflected the colonial partition of the continent more so than “the realities of community
and accountability”79 within the territories of the newly independent states. Combined
with the establishment of Westphalian sovereignty as a cornerstone of African
international relations by the OAU Charter in 1963,80 this lead to a series of
nationbuilding attempts featuring opportunistic authoritarian leadership and a substantial
amount of intrastate conflict over access to the state in the period from the 1960s to the
1990s.81 As Basil Davidson has written, “the nationstatist project – the attempt to turn
colonially formed territories into nationstatist territories – looks increasingly like a
mistake [...].”82 The African state since independence has appeared, at least on the
surface, like the European state which it was modelled on, but functioned quite
differently.83
Norms concerning state sovereignty have not been static, and are more complex
today than the mere principle of noninterference in domestic affairs. Although state
sovereignty continues to play a crucial role in international relations, and the state
remains the primary, albeit not sole, actor in the international domain, there is a gradual
breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.84 As globalization
creates greater interconnectedness between states and societies, “borders are increasingly
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irrelevant for postmodern states,”85 and global and regional integration regimes have
created highly elaborate and legally binding systems of mutual interference in the internal
matters of states. There has consequently been a breakdown of the strict protection of
Westphalian sovereignty on the African continent as well. This paradigm shift was
further accompanied by the emergence of responsibility to protect as a guiding principle
in international relations, and the diminishing of international acceptance of the violent
byproducts of nationstatist projects. The African state today is increasingly accountable
to its partners in policy cooperation and integration, both regionally and internationally.

1.5.

Power
That some people have more power than others is one of the most palpable facts
of human existence. Because of this, the concept of power is as ancient and
ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast.


Robert Dahl

The concept of power is instructive for the study of African regionalism, since
international integration necessarily involves a reconfiguration of the relations of power
between local, national, and regional actors. Power has been considered extensively in
social

and political theory. Existing definitions of power are more operational than

formal,86 that is, they define power in terms of how it is derived and exercised rather than
in terms of what it is. It is possible to identify a formal core within existing operational
definitions of power, namely that, most broadly, power can be defined as the ability to
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make someone else do something, even if this is against their will. Max Weber has thus
defined power as 
“the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in
a social action even against the resistance of others,”87 while Karl Deutsch has defined
the concept as “the ability to prevail in conflict and overcome obstacles”88 in reference to
Lenin’s famous “Who? Whom?”. Lenin’s question alludes to a Marxist understanding of
power, according to which a limited amount of power in society is necessarily distributed
in such a way that one group dominates over another
What the provided definitions have in common is a recognition that power
necessarily involves a relation between people. Wherever there are human communities,
power exists and is exercised, regardless of their level of development or whether the
social and political organization of these communities appears rather hierarchical or
egalitarian at first glance. Thus, “to understand politics is (...) to understand relations of
power in their historical settings.”89 To understand relations of power, however, it is
necessary to first understand the different kinds of power, as well as how those in power
derive it, and what the different ways in which it is exercised are.
Five different kinds of power can be identified: physical, economic, political,
cultural or “soft”, and sticky power. Physical power refers to physical force, such as that
exercised by the military and police. Economic power refers to the ability to achieve
one’s ends through the accumulation and utilization of wealth. The exercise of economic
Scott Appelrouth and Laura Desfor Edles, 
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power is predominantly positive, that is, it involves economic incentives as a reward for
complying with the demands of those exercising economic power, such as in the
relationship between wagepaying firms and their laborers. Economic power can
additionally be exercised negatively through the denial of the means of subsistence.
Political power, on the other hand, is exercised mainly by way of negative incentives in
the form of the threat or use of punishment when those actors over whom political power
is exercised do not comply with the demands of those who possess it. Examples of
political power include criminal procedures against those who break the law and
sanctions against states who fail to implement binding international agreements. Cultural
power is more abstract than the previously discussed forms of power in that it pertains to
the ability to direct the dominant way of thinking in the arts and intellectual life of
society. Sticky power, lastly, is a set of qualities that an actor possesses that motivates
others to follow their lead voluntarily, such as states seeking accession to the European
Union and consequently implementing domestic legal reforms to meet EU regulations
even before accession is approved.
Max Weber has further distinguished between two broad categories of power on
the basis of their legitimacy, namely coercive power and authoritative power.90 While
coercive power involves obtaining an end through mere force, authoritative power
implies consent by those over whom power is exercised. Patrick Chabal, in a similar vein,
has written that “where there is only force there is no power,” 91 and Karl Deutsch that
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“the voluntary or habitual compliance of the mass of the population is the invisible but
very real basis of power for every government.”92 Chabal further argues that although
purely coercive power may occur in human societies, it cannot last as it is inherently
selfdestructive.93
This distinction in the literature between coercive power and legitimized power,
which in its exercise may also involve some degree of coercion, is reflected in Gramsci’s
notion of hegemony. Hegemony may thus be defined as the domination by one group of
people over another that is not purely based on coercion but simultaneously involves
consent.94 The origin and nature of such consent is what Chabal terms political
accountability, referring not to the perceived legitimacy of government but the processes
by which power has historically been reproduced within any given political community.
“Political accountability,” Chabal writes, “defines the framework within which the
political legitimacy of rulers is assessed, the criteria by which they are judged.”95 Rulers,
and political elites more broadly, emerge from society and exercise power over the latter.
Chabal has called this the hegemonic drive. Because hegemony implies a certain amount
of

coercion,

and

because

dissent

is

natural

in

any

political

community,

counterhegemonic projects by actors not in control of the state and its institutions prevail
at any given point in time. So long as the rule of an elite is based in more consent than
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coercion, however, such counterhegemony does not lead to major reconfigurations of
political systems.
Weber distinguishes between three sources of political accountability, which he
alternately terms authoritative power: charisma, tradition, and rational legality. Charisma
refers to personal qualities of leaders which compel others to follow them. Traditional
authority is derived from custom, whereby power is reproduced in hereditary manner,
such as in a monarchy. Rational legal authority, lastly, is based in a universal rule of law
that governs how power is reproduced and how it can be exercised. Talcott Parsons
criticizes the dichotomy in the literature between coercive and consensual power,
suggesting that instead of being discrete forms of power or related to each other in
subordination, both coercive and consensual power are imperative but related to each
other in more complex ways.96
In the African context, there have been two revolutions in political accountability,
or, in other words, reconfigurations of power, namely the imposition of the colonial
system and its abolition at independence.97 While it is difficult to generalize across a
continent as vast and diverse as the African one, precolonial forms of political
organization in Africa can be said to have been characterized less by Weberian
legalrational and depersonalized conceptions of power, and more by a system of
tribalism, that is, the politicization of kinship relations, whereby kinship was a decisive
determinant of access to economic and political power. The concept of tribalism has
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become a controversial one on account of misconceptions that originated from colonial
perceptions of Africa, yet it deserves rehabilitation as a valuable category of political
analysis in its own right, so long as one succeeds in avoiding treating it with a normative
eurocentric lens. Tribalism, like most of political systems, has its own assets as well as
liabilities that are worthy of consideration. Among its liabilities are the aforementioned
distribution of positions of power by kinship relations rather than merit, the social
expectation of unconditional mutual economic support among group members that G
öran
Hydén has famously termed the “economy of affection” and constrictive loyalty of
individuals to their respective groups that can sabotage unity over larger territories. Its
assets, on the other hand, include a strong sense of social solidarity and belonging, group
consciousness, and mutual support between members of a group.
Basil Davidson has characterized precolonial relations of power on the African
continent as contextually legitimate but profoundly misunderstood by colonial masters:
[...] most of these precolonial political formations were communities with a
venerable past rooted in popular acceptance. In the public mind they were living
realities; they were identities to which people strongly held. Dismissing them as
the regrettable phenomenon of “tribalism” might comfort those, British or
otherwise, who preferred to think of precolonial Africa as a kind of savage
backwoods [...].98
Based on this categorization of African power relations as backwards and illegitimate, the
colonial state established itself with either disregard for existing relations of power, or, as
in the case of Belgian divisive ethnic policy toward Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, coopted
them for its own purposes. Furthermore, “the power of the colonial state was not only
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absolute but arbitrary,”99 and derived to a large extent from coercion. With the advent of
independence, African leaders “would then embrace nationstatism as the only available
escape from colonial domination”100 and dismiss the prevailing ethnic diversity in their
national polities as “just another hangover from an unregenerate past.”101 This resulted in
the reconfiguration of power relations in Africa into neopatrimonial networks
characterized by often violent intergroup struggle for access to the state as a source of
wealth. Widespread corruption, as in many other locales globally, created the paradoxical
situation that the political elites of some of Africa’s poorest countries boast some of the
world’s superrich.102 Rather than escaping the grip of colonial power through nationalism,
many African states, under frequently poor leadership, have responded to the
vulnerabilities created by colonialism through powerstructures that benefit few at the
expense of the citizenry. Since the institutions in African states are disproportionately
weak and checks and balances relatively few or unenforced, leaders in Africa in fact have
more, not less, power than their counterparts elsewhere.103
Because struggle over control of the state became a defining feature of power
relations in Africa after independence, Jeffrey Herbst has argued that the implications of
the shape and size of African countries might differ from the implications of geography
on power in Europe. He writes,
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The nationstate rose to dominance in Europe largely because its unique ability to
unite market and population under sovereign rule provided leaders in successive
centuries with ‘economies of scale’ in military, economic, and political affairs
that could not be achieved any other way.104
According to Herbst, African conditions privileged smaller rather than larger states105
inasmuch as a smaller territory had as a consequence fewer challenges for the
consolidation of power after independence. Relating to Davidson’s argument on
nationalism, tribalism and neopatrimonialism, a smaller territory implies less diversity
that needs to be accommodated as a part of any hegemonic project for the national
consolidation of a state’s territory. The way that power in African states, specifically in
the territorially large ones, is exercised today resembles precolonial patterns: It is strong
at the political core of a state but radiates out with decreased authority.106 The most
prominent difference between the exercise of power within African states today and
during precolonial times is that unlike before the fixing of borders, the territorial
boundaries of political formations in Africa was determined by the reach of their power,
not vice versa.107
The question arises here whether closer integration in Africa along the vision of
the early PanAfricanists, such as Nkrumah, and the New PanAfricanists, such as Mbeki,
could constitute a third major reconfiguration of power on the continent. In Chabal’s
words, could there be a third political revolution in Africa? And if so, would it contribute
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to a reconfiguration of power relations in favor of the citizenry and the accommodation of
diversity?

1.6.

Development
The concept of development has proven to be a contentious one in both theory

and practice. While the conventional definition of development, namely sustained
economic growth that is accompanied by institutional transformation, would cause little
disagreement among scholars and policymakers alike, the nature of these institutional
transformations has been contested. Moreover, ideological disagreements as to how
development can be achieved have historically characterized the development discourse,
and international development policy has been criticized for promoting onesizefitsall
Westernstyle modernization without taking into account the particular contexts of
developing countries.
Expanding on the broad definition provided above, development involves not
only an increase in incomes, or economic growth, but also institutional transformation in
the social, economic and cultural spheres. Amartya Sen sees these institutional
transformations as the removal of unfreedoms that leave people without opportunities to
exercise their agency, while according to David Apter, development is the expansion of
alternatives available to individuals and collectives. Development, then, concerns four
areas of society: the environment, the economy, political life, and cultural life. The
environment provides the resources that economic growth is based in; however, it should
only be exploited insofar as future potential for growth is not diminished significantly. In
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the economic sphere, development aims at the creation of favorable material living
standards. Development of the political life involves the creation of inclusive and strong
institutions, the promotion of civic life, and participatory politics. Lastly, transformations
in the previous three areas are accompanied by changes in the cultural life of a society.
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), development, far from merely involving improvements in material living
standards, “
is a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and
spiritual existence.”108
Historically, 
development in a sense did away with the idea of the inherent
superiority of Europe, or, more broadly, developed countries, and instead advanced the
idea that improvement in the human condition would not simply come about by organic
social forces and economic processes but required the intervention by both the
governments in developed and less developed countries in cooperation.109 Based on this
idea, global development policy and practice underwent a series of distinct phases.
During the later part of the era of colonization, development was predominantly
characterized by investment into the infrastructure of the periphery by the colonizing
core.110 During this time, development appeared to be a central idea in order for European
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states to be able to maintain their colonies, but on the contrary eventually proved pivotal
to their conviction that they could give up colonies.111 The 1950s, the years of the coming
of independence on the African continent, were characterized by a development discourse
that emphasized modernization and an increase in national incomes, but when results
failed to materialize, the dependency school emerged in 1960s, arguing that
Westernstyle development policy produced and reproduced economic dependence.112
The response in the 1970s to these tendencies was a shift away from an emphasis on
industrialization and national incomes, and toward an approach that focused on basic
needs, prioritizing the work of nongovernmental organizations over largescale
modernization projects.113 Because developing countries worldwide, but especially on the
African continent, continued to experience economic downturn into the 1980s, two
opposing camps of development critics emerged: Ultramodernists, on the one hand,
believed that 
the rules and processes of economics have proven valid and that the
invisible hand of the market allocates resources efficiently. Postmodernists, on the other
hand, saw development discourse as an apparatus of surveillance and control.114 The
1980s further witnessed the proliferation of SAPs as a neoliberal policy measure aimed at
relieving the economic problems of developing countries that ran significant budget
deficits. In the 1990s, the international community recognized that a new paradigm for
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development was needed in response to the overall disappointing record of international
development since its inception. While no one coherent global paradigm has emerged,
focus has shifted toward initiatives such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, as
well as toward international economic integration as a means to create sustainable
economic growth.115
Development is a continuous process of transformation that occurs in all societies
regardless of their relative level of economic development as economic, political, social
and cultural relations continue to evolve. The concept of development has, however, been
especially important in Africa since independence as both underdevelopment and
undevelopment continue to be a challenge to Africa’s transformation. Underdevelopment
refers to the process by which resources in a country are exploited for the benefit not of
its own people but for that of more economically powerful countries. Historically,
underdevelopment has occurred as the process of exploitation by developed countries of
the resources

of

developing

countries,

both

during

and

after colonization.

Undevelopment, on the other hand, refers to the lack of exploitation of natural resource
potential, be it known or yet undiscovered. The particular experience of colonization in
Africa has, as scholars of the dependency school have argued, resulted in the integration
of African countries into the global economy on unfair terms. The economies of African
countries have under colonialism frequently been transformed from predominantly
selfsufficient systems into economic systems that primarily rely on the production and
export of few or even a single primary commodities. In some instances, such as for the
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production of cocoa in Ghana, colonial powers even introduced a commodity that had
previously not been produced in the territory in question.116 What these transformations
had as their effect were the dependence of many African economies on the export of
primary commodities and lack of economic diversification. This often resulted in
longterm economic difficulties, such as currencies and national incomes being
vulnerable to fluctuations in the global commodity prices, Dutch disease, and the kinds of
extractive economic and political institutions that resource wealth incentivizes. Paul
Collier has labelled a generous natural resource endowment a development trap for the
poorest countries globally, together with conflict, being landlocked without reliable
neighbouring states, and bad governance in small states.117 Collier interestingly sees a
small territory as a liability to economic development,118 even though a small state size
can bring about other advantages, such as the comparatively easier consolidation of
political power as I have elaborated in the review of the concept of power in Chapter 1.5.
Collier’s emphasis on conflict and leadership highlights the importance of
political determinants of the relative success or failure of development in addition to
economic and geographic factors. Claude Ake has gone so far as to contend that in
Africa, “the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never
really on the agenda in the first place,”119 and that “[...] political conditions in Africa are

I
bid, 316.
Paul Collier, 
The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What
Can Be Done About it 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.
118
Ibid, 64.
119
Ake, 
Democracy and Development in Africa
, 1.
116
117

41

the greatest impediment to development.”120 Development, together with nationalism,
replaced decolonization in its centrality on the political agenda of African leaders once
the struggle for independence had been won. With their stateled approach to
development, however, the first generation of postcolonial leaders in Africa actually
reinforced the dependency of African countries, and centralized development
programmes constituted an opportune way to exert control over distrusted civil society
groups.121 Development frequently became an ideology coopted for the production and
reproduction of political domination, a means for leaders to stay in power.122 Robert
Rotberg emphasizes the importance of the quality of leadership for achieving desired
development outcomes in Africa, “where institutions are unusually weak and democratic
political cultures are as yet largely unformed.”123 He makes the argument that imaginative
political leadership with a longterm vision, as opposed to transactional leadership
concerned merely with daily business, or worse, their own benefit, can successfully
counteract impediments to development, such as resource dependence, unfavorable
geography, and corruption.124 The quality of leadership consequently constitutes an
important piece in the puzzle of explaining why some African countries, such as
Botswana and Mauritius, have significantly outperformed others, such as the DRC, in
their developmental success.
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With regards to international integration, the concept of development has been
especially important in Africa, but has continued to play a role in other regional
integration organizations worldwide. In the context of contemporary globalization,
neoliberalism has been one of the primary ideologies with regards to economic
development since the 1980s, and especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The
neoliberal

tendencies

of

economic globalization, however, have meant that

"globalization today is not working for many of the world's poor,”125 and "ideological
market fundamentalism […] produced a set of policies that were more hindrance than
help in producing economic growth and development.”126 To neoliberals, the creation of
regional trade blocs constitutes the second best blueprint for international development
after a fully liberalized world economy in which, according to them, resources would be
allocated in the most efficient manner, and overall welfare would be maximized.127 This
of course does not address concerns about equity, and the neoclassical development
paradigm often ignores history and the structures it creates.128 The central question
regarding development and globalization, then, is whether international economic
integration promotes economic development, or whether its competitive pressures cause
developing countries to fall behind and place limits on the ability of states to provide
public goods and act as welfare states.129 Stiglitz has argued in this regard that in order to
undo some of the disadvantages developing countries face in the globalized economy,
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they should receive special and differential treatment in terms of tariffs and that the
developed world should open its markets but without conditionality or expectation of
political or economic reciprocity.130 Through its various integration efforts, the African
international community has tried to reap such benefits of integration by increasing its
domestic markets through integrating among each other, and thereby increase its
economic bargaining power vis
à
vis the rest, but particularly the developed rest, of the
world.
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Chapter 2.
A History of Integration in Africa
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2.1.

Introduction
The history of African integration in many ways can be traced back to the struggle

against slavery in the United States and the Caribbean and the ideology of
PanAfricanism that it gave rise to. 
Early international integration in Africa was
consequently deeply intertwined with the PanAfricanist movement that first emerged
from the African diaspora in the late nineteenth century. The very idea of a unity of
Africa can be traced back to the emergence of PanAfricanism and the work of W.E.B.
DuBois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and the like. For while, in
Europe, five hundred years ago the rulers of two kingdoms geographically remote from
each other might have easily seen themselves as a part of the same geographical space
they called Christendom, this would not have been true anywhere on the vast and diverse
African continent until the late nineteenth, or even early twentieth century. Where, then,
did the idea of this vast place as a unified entity begin, and how did it lead to the creation
of formal integration regimes that, albeit in evolving nature, persist in Africa to this day?
This chapter seeks to provide a history of African integration that encompasses its major
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organizations – beginning with the the OAU, followed by the AU, AEC, and RECs –
from the inception of the idea of African integration to present.

2.2.

The Organization of African Unity
We have won the battle and we again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to
emancipate other countries in Africa, for our independence is meaningless unless
it is linked up with the liberation of the entire African continent.


Kwame Nkrumah

On the African continent, the impetus for the formal international integration that
manifested itself in the creation of the OAU in 1963 grew primarily out of the
independence movement and PanAfricanism as a political ideology, where early
integration efforts after independence were largely political, although some regional
economic groupings had been established on the continent under colonial rule already.131
The idea of global unity among African peoples and peoples of African origin, albeit less
formalized, had existed at least half a century before the advent of the institutionalization
of continental unity in Africa. The origins of the PanAfricanist movement can be traced
back to the 1900 conference called by the Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams
that was held in London to “protest stealing of lands in the colonies, racial discrimination
and deal with other issues of interest to Blacks,”132 and which later became known as the
First PanAfrican Conference. A number of influential figures, all members of the black
diaspora in the Americas and the Caribbean, have influenced the movement in its early
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stages. Most notably, Edward Wilmot Blyden is widely considered to be the father of the
philosophy of Negritude, while W.E.B. DuBois was the first theorist of PanAfricanism,
and Marcus Garvey had an influence on many of the early PanAfricanists from the
African continent, such as Kwame Nkrumah.133
This early PanAfricanist movement was “an effort to unite the black race in the
struggle for emancipation from racial discrimination, as well as from colonialism,” 134 and
as such less concerned with political or economic integration of the kind that the AU
practices today. Nevertheless, imprints of these notions of liberation from discrimination
and foreign domination on integration in Africa are apparent even at present and after the
official abolition of slavery, as well as the global end of colonialism, apartheid and racial
segregation laws. For although in seeking complete integration of the continent, the AU
has a mandate that transcends the fight against colonialism, the ultimate rationale for
continental unity lies precisely in the fight against foreign domination in the forms of
neocolonialism and dependence. During the years of the First PanAfrican Conference
and the subsequent five PanAfrican Congresses held outside of the African continent
between 1919 and 1945, the PanAfrican movement underwent a change from being
driven predominantly by intellectuals from the diaspora toward inclusion of and
leadership by prominent figures of the struggle for independence on the African
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continent.135 Although the PanAfrican Congresses were aimed at achieving equality for
black people worldwide, and W.E.B. DuBois famously claimed the right for black people
to selfdetermination at the first PanAfrican Congress, the first four PanAfrican
Congresses, held in Paris in 1919, London in 1921 and 1923, and New York in 1927
were still dominated by intellectuals from outside of Africa.136 The fifth PanAfrican
Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, in contrast was called for by Africans from Africa,
and included among its participants Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast (now Ghana),
Wallace Johnson from Sierra Leone, SourouMigan Apithy from Dahomey (now Benin),
and Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya.137 Arguably, the coming together of leaders of the
independence struggle on the African continent laid the foundation for the transformation
of early PanAfricanism into the africanized concept of PanAfricanism that called for
unity and integration of the continent in addition to the liberation from colonialism.
As decolonization gained momentum across Africa, the continent was left even
more territorially fragmented than it had been under colonial rule, so that “the sheer
viability of many of the constituent states was open to question.”138 Following Ghana’s
independence in 1957, the first generation of postindependence leaders in Africa saw
regional integration as a way to overcome the challenges faced by the newly independent
states on a balkanized continent. In 1958, the first Conference of Independent African
States was held in Accra between delegates representing twentyeight African countries
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and colonies, eight of them independent, to discuss the future of the continent. However,
this early unity was complicated when a group of former French colonies joined the club
of newly independent countries in 1960, and disagreement emerged over two key issues,
namely the possibility of territorial reorganization on the continent, and the total
liberation from European powers.139 The second Conference of Independent African
States, which was held in Addis Ababa in 1960, became known for dissent on the
continent.140 The conservative leaders of Cameroon, CongoBrazzaville, Ivory Coast,
Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger,
the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Chad formed the Brazzaville bloc in 1960.141
While they were not opposed to regional integration in itself, they rejected the immediate
establishment of a United States of Africa and sought to maintain a close relationship
with France.142 In response to the Brazzaville bloc, the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Ghana,
Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco formed the radical Casablanca Group in 1961143 which
was deeply committed to the struggle against imperialism and supported the formation of
a United States of Africa. Later in 1961, the Brazzaville Bloc merged with the moderate
leaders of Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Somalia, and Tunisia to form the
Monrovia Group, which favored a loose federation of independent African states over a
United States of Africa.144
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By 1962, it seemed unlikely that an agreement between the two camps regarding
African integration would be reached, especially because there were significant divisions
over the Congo Crisis and Patrice Lumumba. When, however, the UN rejected Tshombe
as potential leader in August 1962,145 the main source of disagreement between radicals
and conservatives disappeared and integration negotiations gained impetus. Finally, Haile
Selassie brought African leaders from the Casablanca and Monrovia groups together in
Addis Ababa in 1963, where the OAU was founded on May 25th by the thirty three
founding states, namely Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo
Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Congo Leopoldville (now Democratic Republic of
Congo), Dahomey (now Benin), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Tunisia, Uganda,
Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Zanzibar (now Tanzania).146 In 1964, African
leaders fixed the map of Africa by accepting colonial borders.147 The remaining states on
the continent joined the OAU as they became independent: Kenya in December 1963,
Malawi and Zambia in 1964, the Gambia in 1965, Botswana and Lesotho in 1966,
Mauritius, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea in 1968, GuineaBissau in 1973, Angola,
Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, as well as Sao Tome and Principe in 1975, the
Seychelles in 1976, Djibouti in 1977, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990, Eritrea in
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1993, and South Africa after the victory against apartheid in 1994.148 Western Sahara,
albeit not independent, joined the OAU in 1982 as a result of which Morocco, which
occupies its territory to date, left the union in 1984 and has not been readmitted since.
The trajectory of African integration has been since 1963 characterized by
compromise between the two former camps in that although regional integration
initiatives in Africa are plentiful, there has been continuous opposition to the
relinquishing of state sovereignty to supranational institutions. Article 3 of the OAU
Charter enshrined the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of member
states, as well as the strict adherence to the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of member states.149 It thereby halted the radical camp’s ambitions for establishing
a United States of Africa and obstructed the accomplishment of the objectives to promote
unity and solidarity among African states and to improve the lives of African peoples
listed in Article 2 of the same charter. The OAU became known at worst as an
intergovernmental club of dictators, and at best as a continental organization that failed to
address its continent’s most pressing issues, such as the 1981 civil war in Chad.150 The
OAU remained intergovernmental with its main institutions being the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government, The Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat. While
the OAU accomplished its objective of fighting colonialism and apartheid with the
exception of the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, as well as that of protecting
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the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, it failed to foster meaningful
economic or political integration on the continent. Considering that the focus of
postindependence leaders throughout most of the OAU era lay primarily on
nationstatism, the consolidation of political power, and stateled development within
their territories, however, the OAU has arguably never set out create or implement any
integration policies that would have involved a relinquishing of national power in favor
of continental frameworks in the first place.
The failure of African leadership at the continental, or even regional, level to
foster integration, collectively strive for solutions to the widespread problems on the
continent, and to create systems of mutual accountability was mirrored in
overwhelmingly poor leadership and policy domestically. By the 1980s at the latest, the
hopes for development that had emerged after independence had chiefly disappeared with
numerous African states running immense budget deficits and increasingly failing to
provide essential public goods. The 1980s thus became known as “the lost decade” in
Africa due to the severe economic problems, increased debt, falling tax revenues and
reduced public spending.151 The involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions via SAPs
with hindsight proved to be a one sizefits all approach to recovery from economic crisis
that worsened the overall economic situation in affected countries, and “in effect,
Western donor institutions took over as Africa’s bankers.”152

Martin Meredith, 
The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence
(London: Free Press, 2005), 368.
152
Ibid, 369.
151

52

The austerity measures thus imposed on African governments in the 1980s
notably challenged the legitimacy of authoritarian leaders in many African countries,153
since their mismanagement of the state was the ultimate cause of the crisis before and
after the SAPs. Popular demand for more participatory governance rose, and paradigms
concerning governance gradually began to shift on the continent. When what Samuel
Huntington termed the third wave of democracy154 brought about the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, there was a spillover effect and “over a period of five years, most
of the oneparty systems that had prevailed in Africa for a generation were
dismantled.”155 With Soviet support for African socialism elapsed, states across Africa
transitioned away from authoritarian rule, but it was less clear what they were
transitioning toward, as many of them remained caught in the grey zone between
dictatorial rule and democracy.156 While many observers began to speak of an “African
renaissance” and authoritarian rule became less acceptable on the continent toward the
new millennium, the achievements of the third wave of democracy in Africa remained
limited and uneven. Nonetheless, during the last decade of the twentieth century, voices
among African leadership grew louder to overhaul regional and continental integration
regimes.
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2.3.

The African Union
An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and
representing a dynamic force in global arena.


African Union Vision

The time has come that we say enough and no more, and by acting to banish the
shame, remake ourselves as the midwives of the African Renaissance.


Thabo Mbeki

As we prepare to enter the 21st century and cognisant of the challenges that will
confront our continent and peoples, we emphasise the imperative need and a high
sense of urgency to rekindle the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity,
solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of' peoples transcending cultural,
ideological, ethnic and national differences.


Sirte Declaration

The history of the OAU brings out the fundamental challenge of PanAfricanism,
namely whether it can be translated into effective continental institutions,157 or whether
ideas of solidarity and unity crumble when faced with the political and economic realities
of Africa since independence. If PanAfricanism is not only the ideology of liberation of
blacks from slavery and racial discrimination that it initially emerged as from the African
diaspora in the Americas and Caribbean, but represents also a “strategy for social
solidarity, as well as cultural, political and economic emancipation”158 among Africans in
Africa, then a continental African organization ought at a minimum to strive to combat
factors that threaten these objectives. It was in the context of acknowledging that the
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OAU and the national leaders that had dominated it for most of its lifespan in fact
perpetuated such threats to PanAfrican objectives that a new generation of PanAfrican
leaders, lead by Thabo Mbeki, called for an African renaissance. This initiative was “born
out of a deep desire to revive a marginalized and exploited continent ravaged by centuries
of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, exploitation, oppression, conflict and hunger,”
159

through the kind of integration the OAU had hitherto not attempted, or initiated yet not

implemented: integration that generates African solutions to African problems and
ensures their execution. With its emphasis on the concepts of unity and solidarity, the call
for an African renaissance returned the question of what has the capacity to unite a billion
people across a vast and vastly diverse continent. After all, if there is nothing that can
unite Africans other than geography, the idea that integration can bring about African
solutions to African problems is at best idealistic.160 The African renaissance
presupposes, just as PanAfricanism had presupposed throughout its history, that Africa
is united and capable of speaking with one voice despite its diversity,161 and that the
failure of the OAU to institutionalize African emancipation through African integration
was caused primarily by a lack of commitment of African political leadership to good
governance rather than an inherent implausibility of continental unity. The fundamental
difference between early African PanAfricanism and the new PanAfricanism of the
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African renaissance advocated for by the new generation of PanAfricanists in the 1990s
and 2000s lies in the assertion that with regard to emancipation from colonialism and its
effects,
African political and economic thought has been trapped in its own myths [...], it
has been misused by dictators in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Guinea,
Togo and Cameroon, who claim that the rest of the world has no business
criticizing their human rights violations, stolen elections, and culture of
corruption.162
The leaders that eventually brought the AU into being thus positioned themselves outside
the previously prevailing paradigm of bad governance and created the new
PanAfricanism as a truly Janusfaced philosophy: continuously outward looking in its
aspiration to fight the effects of colonialism and imperialism, yet looking inward with
selfreflection at the factors beyond colonialism which have contributed to the dire
political and economic condition of the continent after independence. These new leaders
in a sense positioned themselves in opposition to the remainder of authoritarian
leadership and dreamt up a reconfiguration of African integration that would target the
perpetuation of human rights violations, stolen elections and the culture of corruption.
To understand why the OAU was transformed into the AU with the adoption of
the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lomé, Togo, in 2000, the following question
must first be answered: What characterized the historical context that this new
PanAfricanism and the idea of African solutions for African problems emerged from?
On the one hand, the transitions away from authoritarianisms that proliferated following
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the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fostered a culture of hope for participatory
politics and improved domestic governance across Africa. On the other hand, these
transitions coincided with the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1980s.
This period was characterized by increased foreign involvement on the continent beyond
the infamous SAPs. Often, foreign actors would become involved in the domestic affairs
of economically viable countries, but beyond the SAPs, involvement in poor countries
was perceived to be lacking by African leaders, as was exemplified by retreat of the
international community form the international intervention in the Rwandan genocide in
1994.163 External agendas, driven by global demand for African commodities such as oil
and coltan, moreover continued to influence African international relations.164 This
challenged the credibility of the international development discourse of the time. And
despite political transitions occurring domestically, the economic situation across the
continent remained precarious in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2002, Africa’s share in
world trade fell from 2.7 per cent to 2 per cent.165 These events raised to question African
domestic and regional policy at once. In the crisis years between the 1970s and 1990s, in
fact, it was predominantly the UNECA that drove continental policy, such as through the
creation in 1980s of the Lagos Plan of Action.166
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The historical context of this period therefore generated the desire to reinvigorate
integration in two ways. Firstly, foreign involvement in African affairs continued to be
perceived negatively on the continent, and African influence in global economic and
political affairs remained negligible. Moreover, the modern world system that African
countries had been incorporated into at independence persisted as one that perpetuates
economic dependency and political conditionality, hampering the potential for African
development. Pooling of influence presented itself as a mechanism to improve Africa’s
position in global relations. Secondly, as authoritarian rule became less acceptable, the
leadership of many OAU member states changed, and critiquing domestic governance
became somewhat more commonplace. Recognition followed that if the continent was to
become more prosperous and powerful, domestic economic, political, and social
problems had to be addressed first. A revised continental integration regime would
accordingly allow the formulating of shared goals and developing of new mechanisms for
mutual accountability.
The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1981 World Bank report “Accelerated
Development in SubSaharan Africa: A Plan for Action”, known better as the Berg
Report, were among the first attempts to stimulate a transformation of the continent.
They underscore the tension between the domestic and international causes of Africa’s
economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s. While the OAUbacked Lagos Plan of Action
produced by the UNECA blamed the dire condition of many African economies on
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remnants of colonialism and imperialism, the Berg Report identified domestic budgetary
mismanagement and poor governance as the root causes of the crisis. By implication, the
UNECA and World Bank proposed different remedies for the problem. The former
advocated for increased economic selfsufficiency of the continent and improved terms of
trade. The latter instead saw increased trade liberalization and integration into the global
economy as the solution. The Lagos Plan of Action failed to be implemented in light of
the economic situation on the ground and its criticism by the World Bank, and the tension
between the two explanations of the crisis informed the transformation of the OAU into
the AU. OAU member states had set up a committee for the review of the OAU Charter
in 1979 already,167 yet by the 1996 it was obvious that it possessed “an apparent lack of a
sense of urgency.”168 In the 1999 Sirte Declaration, member states thus proclaimed the
coming establishment of an African Union, without, however, specifying whether it
should exist alongside or instead of the OAU and the AEC. Plans to reconfigure the OAU
were abandoned altogether with the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in Lomé in
2000. With its entry into force in May 2001, following ratification by twothirds of the
member states, the AU was officially created to supersede the OAU.
The limited achievements of the OAU with regards to its objectives of deepening
integration in Africa and improving the lives of African people, combined with the
emerging shift in the governance paradigm, hence prompted African leadership to

“Organization of African Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU),” Department of
International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa), accessed March 3, 2016,
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm.
168
Maluwa, “The Transition from the Organization of African Unity to the African

Union,” 30.
167

59

abandon the OAU altogether. In 2001, the AU superseded the OAU and the optimism of
African leaders was evident at the AU inaugural summit in Durban in 2002.169 The AU
not only revised the OAU’s insistence on sovereign selfdetermination and the principle
of noninterference, it was also established to have more powers and institutions than the
OAU. Most notably, the Constitutive Act of the African Union established a
Commission, a Court of Justice, and the PanAfrican Parliament in addition to some
specialized committees and initiatives.170 The AU furthermore consolidated the many
regional integration initiatives that had developed on the continent by recognizing eight
RECs in its Constitutive Act as the building blocks of the AEC, which had been
established by the Abuja Treaty in 1991 and is meant to achieve complete economic
integration by 2027.171 I address the history of the AEC more fully in the following
section.
With the transition from OAU to AU, the African political community underwent
a paradigm shift in its norms surrounding state sovereignty and the principle of
noninterference in the domestic affairs of states. The AU Constitutive Act diverges to a
great extent from the OAU Charter in this regard. While the OAU was built around the
strict principle of nonínterference as outlined in the previous section, the AU
Constitutive Act includes among its objectives the promotion of peace, security and
stability on the continent,172 and provides the “right of the Union to intervene in a
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member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.173 This de jure change in
practice creates normative pressures and exemplifies that the internal affairs of Member
States matter to the union  a necessary precondition for future integration.
The Constitutive Act has moreover been amended in 2003 to include the
possibility of AU intervention in a Member State upon a recommendation by the Peace
and Security Council (PSC) if a “serious threat to legitimate order”174 is present, or “to
restore peace and stability to the Member State.”175 The AU has thereby become the only
regional integration organization that has granted itself the right to interfere in its member
states in the case of instability or a coup d’état. Countries in which a coup d'état occurs
are moreover immediately suspended from their AU membership, as was the case in
Togo and Madagascar in 2009 and Niger in 2010.176 AU troops have moreover intervened
following coups d'état in Mali in 2012, and Togo and Mauritania in 2005.177
Since its inauguration in 2002, the AU has seen the development of four major
initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the
African Governance Architecture (AGA). 
In the year of its establishment, the new
PanAfrican organization ratified NEPAD, which had been established by the OAU in
2001. A technical body of the AU, NEPAD aims “
address Africa's development
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problems within a new paradigm.”178 NEPAD represents an attempt to institutionalize
PanAfricanism via a strategic framework, but has also been criticised for being based on
neoliberalism’s “unholy trinity” of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.179 Also
in 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the
African Union, which amended Article 5 of the Constitutive Act, thereby establishing the
PSC. The PSC forms one pillar of the APSA, the other four pillars being the Panel of the
Wise, the AU Peace Fund, the Continental Early Warning System and the African
Standby Force. These four were established by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which came into effect in 2003
after adoption in 2002. The APRM is a voluntary review mechanism that seeks to ensure
participating member states’ conformity with the values of the AU in the areas of
political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socioeconomic
development. It was created in 2003. The AGA was created in 2010 with the mandate to
coordinate between the various AU bodies tasked with promoting good governance. It
consists of three pillars: vision, institutional framework and processes of interaction
between relevant bodies.180
The AU replaced the OAU with the ambitious goal of spearheading an African
transformation in line with the idea of an African renaissance. It was created to promote
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peace and security, accelerate and intensify integration, foster development, improve
governance, and more. De jure, the AU has institutionalized the Janusfaced new
PanAfricanism that simultaneously aspires to change Africa’s position in global relations
and improve the lives of African people. The question, then, is to what extent this
institutionalized PanAfricanism is being implemented in practice. As one informant has
pointed out to me,
the AU is certainly a stronger organization than the OAU, yet it would be wrong
to say the AU and its commission have similar powers to that of the EU.181

2.4.

The African Economic Community
The African Economic Community was established in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty,

which functions as a blueprint for the complete economic integration of African States
by 2027. The AEC has these ultimate objectives:
● the liberalization of trade between member states through the abolition of tariffs
and nontariff barriers182
● the harmonization of national policies affecting trade183
● the adoption of a common external trade policy184
● the establishment of a common market185
● the adoption of a common external tariff186
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● the removal of obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, persons and
capital187
● the establishment of a PanAfrican economic and monetary union.188

These objectives are to be achieved in six stages over a transitional period not exceeding
thirtyfour years189 after the ratification of the treaty which occurred in May 1994. The
duration of the first stage is set to five years with the goal of strengthening existing RECs
and creating new RECs where they do not exist on the continent.190 The second stage has
as its objectives the stabilization of tariffs, nontariff barriers to trade, customs duties and
internal taxes,191 the strengthening of sectoral policies between member states, 192 and the
coordination of policies between the RECs.193 This stage is set at eight years.194 The third
stage requires the eight RECs to each establish a free trade area and a customs union
during a period not exceeding ten years.195 The fourth stage then calls for the
harmonization of tariff and nontariff systems over a period of two years.196 The fifth stage
requires member states to harmonize sectoral policies,197 as well as the harmonization of
monetary, fiscal and financial policies198 during a period not exceeding four years.199 In
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this stage, the principle of free movement of persons shall be applied. The sixth and last
stage is set at a duration of five years200 and has the following objectives relating to
economic integration: the strengthening of the common market through the completely
free movement of goods, services, capital and people;201 the establishment of a
PanAfrican Economic and Monetary Union;202 the creation of a central bank and
introduction of a common currency.203
The legal relationship between the AU and the AEC remains ambiguous. The
2001 Constitutive Act of the African Union takes precedent over the Abuja Treaty and
supersedes any of its provisions that are contradictory to the Constitutive Act.204
However, this seems to be largely a precautionary provision since the Abuja Treaty is far
more detailed with regards to economic integration. The relationship between the AU and
the RECs is governed by the 
Protocol on Relations Between the African Economic
Community and the Regional Economic Communities, which establishes an institutional
framework for negotiations between the AU and the RECs, as well as among the RECs.
These negotiations are somewhat informal and lack enforceable legal character. The
continental framework for economic integration is consequently vastly ambitious in
character and scope, and the timely attainment of the goals outlined in the Abuja Treaty is
questionable, even though progress is being made among the eight RECs.
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2.5.

The Regional Economic Communities
Eight RECs form the building blocks of the African Union and the African

Economic Community: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of
SahelSaharan States (CENSAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). In this section, I discuss their development and
institutional framework.

2.5.1. The Arab Maghreb Union
Attempts to integrate the Arab states of North Africa date back to the
establishment of the 
Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM) in 1964
between Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya that had as its aim the harmonization of
policy regarding development and interregional trade with the European Economic
Community (EEC).205 These plans never materialized, and 
the AMU was consequently
established in 1989 by the Treaty of Marrakesh by the heads of states of Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania. Although the hopes for political and economic
integration in the North African region were high, progress has remained limited as
controversy over the status of Western Sahara continues to define the relationship
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between Algeria and Morocco.206 Since its inception, AMU has hosted a mere six
summits of its heads of states, all between 1990 and 1994,207 and North Africa remains
one of the least integrated regions globally.208 In light of the anticipated negotiations for
the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) planned under the AEC framework, a
draft FTA agreement was signed and working group was set up in 2010 to develop a
protocol on rules of origin in preparation for the creation of an FTA.209 These rules of
origin continued to be negotiated as this thesis was written.

2.5.2. The Community of SahelSaharan States
CENSAD was established by Mali, Niger Chad, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Libya
under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi in 1998 and became an REC of the AU in
2000.210 Its current member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
GuineaBissau, Liberia, Libya, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
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Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.211
Given its comparably recent establishment and broad membership, CENSAD has not
begun the process of the establishment of its FTA. Because all of its members have
membership in at least one other REC, a CENSAD FTA would be impossible to
implement, since it is not legally possible to adopt two differing external tariff regimes at
once.

2.5.3. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
The COMESA came into being with the establishment of a preferential trade area
by the Treaty of Lusaka in 1981. Today, the COMESA is composed of the following
nineteen member states: Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan,
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.212 Although the implementation of both the
COMESA free trade area and customs union are in progress, not all member states
participate in them. Five member states, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Swaziland, the
Seychelles and the DRC are not yet parties to the free trade agreement of the COMESA.
213

The implementation of the customs union has been complicated not only by the

principle of variable geometry, but also by the problem of multiple membership. Kenya
and Uganda were legally unable to join the COMESA customs union as they are already
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parties to the EAC customs union.214 Thus, the common external tariff which has been
established for four separate product categories with customs duties ranging from zero
per cent to twentyfive per cent is hardly implemented today.

2.5.4. The East African Community
The EAC was reestablished by the 1999 Arusha Treaty215 after the dissolution of
the former East African Community in 1977216 and is comprised today of the Republics
of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania.217 The
economic integration achievements of the EAC include the implementation of a common
market and adaptation of a common external tariff scheme, as well as the harmonization
of certain economic policies and technical standards.218 Although the implementation of
tariff reduction schedules is not entirely completed in all member states, the EAC has at
least legally completed the third stage of African economic integration as set out by the
Abuja Treaty, and all its members are parties to the common market and customs union
which are fully in force.219
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2.5.5. The Economic Community of Central African States
The ECCAS was established in 1983 by the member states of the Central African
Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and the Economic Community of the Great
Lakes States (CEPGL), as well as Sao Tome and Principe and Angola, and subsequently
replaced these two organizations. Its members are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and
Sao Tome and Principe. The ECCAS FTA has been de jure launched in 2004, but not yet
established de facto since reforms in the member states are awaited.220

2.5.6. The Economic Community of West African States
The ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. Its member states
are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger,Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania used to
be a member, but withdrew in 2000. The West African Customs and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) is comprised of a monetary union and a currency union for the ECOWAS
member states. Participating states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
GuineaBissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.
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2.5.7. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
The IGAD replaced its predecessor, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought
and Development (IGADD), in 1996 in an effort to reinvigorate international cooperation
in East Africa. The members of IGAD are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
Sudan, and Uganda. While the IGADD had been created in in 1986 as an organization to
facilitate intergovernmental development and drought control policy, the IGAD has
among its objectives cooperation in an expanded number of policy areas. Interestingly,
one of its objectives is to promote and implement the objectives of the COMESA and the
EAC. An IGAD FTA planned for 2009 was thus meant to be in harmony with the
COMESA FTA, but has not yet been implemented.

2.5.8. The Southern African Development Community
The SADC was created in 1992 to supersede the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC). The SADC is split into the community at large
which is composed of fifteen member states, and the South African Customs Union
(SACU), which was established in 1910 and is the oldest customs union in the world. The
SADC has not yet reached the participation of all its members in its free trade area and
customs union. The members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Of these, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland participate in the SACU. While the SACU is a completed free
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trade area and customs union, the SADC is making progress on the establishment and
implementation of a free trade area but not a customs union.

2.5.9. The Tripartite Free Trade Area
According to the economic integration schedule set out in the Abuja Treaty, all
RECs on the continent are supposed to each implement a free trade area and adopt a
common external tariff by 2016,221 while the deadline for REC mergers is less clearly
outlined in the Abuja Treaty and merely envisions complete economic integration of the
continent by 2027.222 The problem of multiple membership and overlapping legal regimes
in economic integration is especially prominent in Eastern and Southern Africa. The
Tripartite Free Trade Area aims at reducing these ambiguities through harmonizing
policies in the wider East and South African region. It was established between the
COMESA, the EAC, and the SADC and launched in June 2015.223
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Chapter 3.
Europe as a Model for Integration in Africa?
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3.1.

Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the historical, institutional and legal evolution of

continental integration in Africa from the decades that preceded the inception of the OAU
to the present of the AU and its constituent RECs, as well as the AEC. Before turning to
an assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the AU in Chapter 4, an
exploration of continental integration in Europe is instructive, since the EU constitutes
the most complete example of regional integration worldwide. This chapter is hence
devoted to this question: What lessons, if any, does the experience of continental
integration in Europe provide for African continental integration? I begin by first
outlining the reasoning behind and pitfalls of drawing comparisons between the EU and
the AU. Secondly, I discuss the similarities and differences between the two
organizations in terms of their history and institutions, followed by, thirdly, an analysis of
the main achievements and shortcomings of the EU. Lastly, I outline the core lessons I
have identified which the EU can provide for the future of the AU.
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3.2.

Reasons for and Pitfalls of Comparing Regional Integration
First, it is important to consider what speaks for a comparative study of the AU

and the EU, as well as the factors that demand a critical approach to such a comparison.
As was discussed in the review of the concept of integration in Chapter 1.3, there exists a
fundamental theoretical problem in the study of nonEuropean regional integration.
Despite the proliferation of a multitude of diverse regional integration agreements and
organizations worldwide, such as NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in Latin
America, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and ANZCERTA in Australasia, to name only a
few, international integration tends to be analyzed utilizing the Eurocentric conceptual
frameworks that were developed against the backdrop of European integration. This fact
leads to two specific theoretical problems for the study of nonEuropean integration.
Firstly, the relative achievements and shortcomings of integration agreements and
organizations are frequently measured by the standards of the achievements of European
integration. Because the EU today boasts by far the deepest integration among the various
regional integration agreements and organizations worldwide, encompassing a monetary
union, an economic union, and a common market, albeit with varying patterns of
membership in each, any nonEuropean regional organization will inevitably appear
either incomplete, such as NAFTA that as its name suggests is a free trade area only, or
weak, such as ASEAN and the AU, where integration is ambitious de jure but
implementation is slow and incomplete in practice.
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Secondly, the very use of Eurocentric conceptual framework for understanding
the reasoning behind and progression of regional integration is inadequate where regional
integration arose out of a different logic than the ECSC in the context of the aftermath of
the Second World War, and where integration followed a different legal and institutional
progression than in the European case. Moreover, international integration regimes
worldwide vary greatly in their functional scope, number of member states, as well as
institutional setup, and further differ in their raison d’etre which may range from
economic gains to geopolitics and even the creation of new collective identities.224 With
these considerations in mind, the EU and the AU nevertheless warrant a cautious
comparison given the apparent similarities between the organizations’ institutional
designs.
The EU and AU were born out of different historical moments and within vastly
different economic, political, and social realities. On the one hand, the origins of formal
European integration that lead in 1992 to the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht that
created the EU lie in the postwar efforts to prevent the resurfacing of hostilities between
France and Germany through integrating their coal and steel sectors. The roots of the AU
amidst the continental struggle for independence in the second half of the twentieth
century, on the other hand, cannot be found in such an attempt at the pacification of
interstate conflict. Although conflicts in Africa were plentiful in the period from 1951,
when Libya became the first country on the continent to gain independence, and 1963,
when the OAU was established, these conflicts did not predominantly occur between
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independent African states. Rather, warfare in this period of African history can be
classified as either wars of liberation between colonized countries and their colonizers, or
civil wars.
Despite these vastly different realities of Europe and Africa at the respective time
of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the OAU
in 1963, the institutional makeup of the AU at the time of its establishment in 2001 was
modelled after that of the EU to a great extent. In the eyes of many, among them also
African politicians, the institutional design of the EU did not only provide a blueprint for
the creation of the AU, but the “process and outcome of African integration must also
follow the logic and trajectory of European integration.”225 Taking into account the
outlined differences in the initial logic that drove the first steps of integration in Europe
and Africa respectively, a cautious comparative study of the AU and EU is thus further
warranted by the very outlook of the creators of the AU on the EU despite the
fundamental differences in the long term histories of the two integration efforts.

3.3.

Similarities and Differences Between the European Union and
African Union
Here, I provide an analysis of the ways in which the EU and the AU are

historically and institutionally at once alike and distinct. The specific similarities and
differences between the EU and the AU both in terms of institutional design and
institutional history necessitate consideration before any aspects of European integration
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can be identified as instructive for integration at the AU. I have established the divergent
economic, political, and social realities that initiated early European and African
integration in the previous subsection. In addition, the two continents took divergent
roads to arrive at the present condition of of their respective continental organizations.
These divergent paths over time were shaped by the history of the two continents and
manifested themselves in institutional differences both in law and in practice.

3.3.1. Historical Similarities and Differences
The AU and EU developed quite differently. Not only was the initial logic for
integrating distinct on the African continent from that in Europe, European integration
also evolved in an expanding manner, while African integration encompassed all
independent African states from the start until the withdrawal of Morocco from the OAU
in 1984 in response to the 1982 admission of Western Sahara as a member state of the
OAU. In addition, European states generally adopted agreements for future steps in
integration once previous steps were ratified and implemented, so that the de facto nature
of European integration at any given period in time parallelled its de jure blueprint. This
does not, however, mean that longerterm visions for future integration did not exist in
European integration. Rather, longterm visions were translated into law gradually.
During the OAU era, African integration can be said to have followed a somewhat
similar pattern of progression, with twentyone treaties, conventions, protocols and
charters adopted between 1963 and 1998, as opposed to a staggering

twentyeight

between 2001 and 2014 at the AU. Nevertheless, the trend of adopting ambitious legal
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text prior to the complete implementation of previous legal obligations has its roots in the
OAU era and has intensified during the AU years. Thus, the de jure stage of integration in
Africa is far ahead of its de facto nature. Because I have provided the history of African
integration in Chapter 1, I now briefly review the history of European integration to the
extent that it is necessary to draw comparisons with the African integration experience.
The history of European enlargement stands in stark contrast to the establishment
of the OAU by 32 states in 1963 and the immediate accession of an additional 20 states
upon their independence. Similarly, the legal and institutional development of the EU
followed a much more gradual path than that of African integration with its ambitious
founding documents of 1963 and 2001 respectively. As previously stated, European
integration was born out of the desire to put an end to the centuries old antagonisms and
conflicts between France and Germany. To this end, French foreign minister at the time
Robert Schuman proposed what became known as the Schuman Plan in 1950. The plan
envisioned the integration of German and French coal and steel industries to induce
cooperation and disincentivize conflict between the two states. On Schuman’s
recommendation, the 1951 Treaty of Paris established the ECSC. The ECSC had as its
member states not only France and West Germany, but also Belgium, Italy, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg. These initial six temporarily made up the core of
European integration but the Treaty of Paris announced in its preamble that the ECSC
was to be merely the first step to further integration in Europe.226
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European States saw closer political and economic integration as a way to further
sustainable peace on the continent, and in 1957 the ECSC countries signed the Treaty of
Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom.227 In 1965,
The Merger Treaty combined the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom into the EC, and merged
their institutions into a single governance structure.228 In 1973, Britain, Denmark, and
Ireland joined the EC. Greece then joined the EC in 1981, followed by Spain and
Portugal in 1986 after Franco’s and Salazar’s regimes had fallen. In the same year, the
Single European Act was signed, furthering European integration through extending
qualified majority voting, and extending the legislative powers of the EP.229 It moreover
set the objective for a single market to be established among member states by the end of
1992.230
As Europe became increasingly more economically and politically integrated,
plans were being made for the establishment of an even more integrated union with a
single market and common currency. In 1990, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was
launched and exchange controls abolished, which completely liberalized the flow of
capital in the EC. Two years later, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed and the EU
thereby established. It further extended the legislative powers of the EP and qualified
majority voting, thereby increasing the number of policy areas in which the EU acts as a
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supranational rather than intergovernmental organization. The EU continued to expand.
In 1995, Sweden, Austria, and Finland became part of the union. Simultaneously,
economic and political integration was advancing and in 2002 the euro was introduced.
Following the collapse of statist orders in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991,
the EU also began accession negotiations with formerly Soviet republics and other
countries previously led by communist parties, leading to the enlargements of 2004 and
2007. In 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.231
Popular support for further political integration of the EU in many member states had
begun to decline after the 2004 enlargement, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe (TCE), signed in the same year by twentyfive EU member states, failed to
come into force despite eighteen ratifications after it had been rejected by French and
Dutch voters in 2005. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007 as a compromise between
eurosceptics and those who wished to advance integration. It came into force in 2009.
Rather than establishing a single European constitution as the TCE would have, it
amended the Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Maastricht and renamed them to become the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Treaty on European Union
(TEU). The Treaty of Lisbon “
[met] the need to reform the structure of the EU and the
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way in which it functions.”232 
In 2013, Croatia acceded the EU to become it newest
member state.

3.3.2. Institutional Similarities and Differences
In addition to divergent historical paths, the institutions of the AU and EU are
distinct in their design and functioning despite certain similarities. Beginning with the
institutional similarities between the two organizations, it becomes apparent how closely
the superficial institutional design of the AU resembles that of the EU. Both
organizations have a commission, a parliament, a court of justice as well as a court of
human rights (although the European Court of Human Rights of course exists under the
Council of Europe, the membership of which extends beyond the member states of the
European Union). Moreover, each organization has two executive organs of which one is
comprised of the heads of states and the other of national ministers, an economic and
social committee, and a committee of permanent representatives.
In principle, then, the AU Commission (AUC) resembles the European
Commission (EC), the PanAfrican Parliament (PAP) resembles the European Parliament
(EP), the African Court of Justice (ACJ) resembles the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government resembles the European Council of
the EU, the AU Executive Council resembles the EU’s Council of Ministers, the
Economic, Social, and Cultural Council of the AU (ECOSOCC) resembles the EU’s
Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), and, lastly, the AU’s Permanent
“The Treaty of Lisbon: introduction,” European Union, accessed February 28, 2016,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aai0033.
232
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Representatives

Committee

resembles

the

EU’s

Committee

of

Permanent

Representatives.233 There are, however, important differences between these seemingly
alike institutional designs. The above pairs of institutional organs do not necessarily
possess the same functional scope in practice and unlike the EU, the AU is more
intergovernmental than supranational. The most pronounced differences in functional
scope of the two organizations’ corresponding organs can be found between the two
commissions, the European Council and the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, as well as the EP and PAP.
While as a staff member of the AU pointed out to me, “the AU Commission is
still seen as the secretariat of the member states,”234 the European Commission is
inherently supranational in nature. Its staff members represent the interest of the EU, not
that of their country of citizenship. The same informant expressed that although the
design of the commission was to an extent a copy of the European model, the AUC was
created without the same powers the EC possesses. As a result, it was quickly discovered
that the AUC could not function in the way it was set up and discussion was consequently
underway at the time of interviewing for streamlining the commission, that is, to
restructure it to better respond to its tasks and pressures.235 According to the informant,
the draft plan for this was to be due in January 2016 but at the time of writing, no such
plan was accessible online. Instead, the restructuring of the AUC was to be addressed by
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the Executive Council at the AU Ministerial Retreat in Mekele, Ethiopia, on January 24,
2016.236
The European Council of the EU, too, is more supranational than the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government. At the AU, heads of states and government must “take
its decisions by consensus, or, failing which, by a twothirds majority of the Member
States of the Union.”237 At the European Council, on the other hand, any decision that is
taken during ordinary legislative procedure, under which approximately eighty per cent
of EU legislation is adopted, is taken by qualified majority voting (QMV).238 under this
voting system, two conditions must be satisfied for a proposal to pass. First, fiftyfive per
cent, or sixteen out of twentyeight of member states, must vote in favor. Secondly, the
member states voting in favor must represent a minimum of sixtyfive per cent of the
total EU population.239 Hence, while at the AU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government consensus is the rule and majority voting the exception, the opposite is true
of the European Council.
With regards to the parliaments of the EU and the AU, it is striking that at first,
the PAP was established without full legislative powers and that its members are not
directly elected by the citizens of member states, both of which have been true of the EP
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since 1979. The AU is currently working to transform the PAP into a legislative body
similar in nature to the EP. To this end, the PAP is given legislative powers by the
revised Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union Relating to the PanAfrican
Parliament.240 Until this protocol comes into force, however, the PAP will remain a
consultative assembly instead of a legislative body like the EP.

3.4.

Achievements and Shortcomings of European Integration
What are the achievements of the EU and its predecessor organizations to date

and how have challenges affected the performance of the EU and perhaps lead to
shortcomings? The previous section provided the formal history of integration in Europe.
To understand the lessons, positive and negative, that the European experience has to
offer for African states, it is necessary to understand the achievements and shortcomings
that the formal history of European integration has as its consequence.

3.4.1. Achievements of European Integration
Historically, the main achievement of the EU lies in its contribution to stability
and economic prosperity on the European continent. The EU and its predecessor
organizations have managed to create and maintain peace among its member states on a
continent that had previously been shaken by centuries of warfare, although of course it
must be contended here that this achievement is relativized by the small number of states
participating in European integration at a given time. Thus, the conflicts in Cyprus in
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1974, Croatia from 1991 to 1995, and Slovenia in 1991 occurred on the European
continent but before these states sought accession to the EU.
The second, and quite technical, achievement lies in the degree of economic,
political, and social integration that has been achieved and the effect this had on the lives
of European citizens. The EU has successfully implemented a single market and
guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. EU citizens today
can seek employment in any member state without discrimination, many university
students take part in the Erasmus exchange program, and for many, albeit not all,
Europeans, nationals from other member states are no longer complete strangers. The EU
is furthermore politically integrated in policy areas ranging from agriculture to criminal
investigations and foreign policy. Thanks to the EU and its predecessors, Europe has
therefore become a truly interconnected region not only for governments and firms but
also for its citizens, and Europeans today are quite aware of the privileges and
responsibilities that accompany their being a citizen not only of their home country but
also the EU.
The third achievement relates back to peace, namely the EU’s ability to exert
sticky power over its applicants and new member states and thereby spread norms of
democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Accession negotiations to the EU
presuppose a willingness of candidate states to implement the acquis communautaire, the
union’s set of legal standards for integrated policy areas. The incorporation of the
formerly socialist countries and former Soviet republics in the 2004 and 2007
enlargement, as well as Croatia’s recent accession, exemplify the EU’s ability to fuel
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democratization, economic development and the rule of law in neighbouring countries
through integrating them into the union.
The final achievement of European integration that I would like to highlight here
is the predominantly supranational nature of the EU today. While the intergovernmental
European Council is responsible for setting the agenda of the EU, the European
institutions that create and implement policy have autonomous powers and their decisions
are legally binding for member states. In the European Council, decisions are taken by
qualified majority voting rather than by consensus. The supranational nature of the EU is
further exemplified by the fact that employees of the European Commission act in the
interest of the union and not of the member state that they are citizens of. The creation
and functioning of the ECJ further highlights this major achievement of the EU, since it is
not only one of the most active regional courts, but also has jurisdiction over cases
between individual European citizens and the member states. It is therefore a truly
supranational institution that acts in the interest of the union and protects the rights that
European citizens are granted by the treaties. As a consequence of its supranational
nature, the EU constitutes a political entity that is more than just a secretariat for its
member states. It has developed into an organization that in many ways acts in its own
interests and protects these as they are defined in the treaties.

3.4.2. Shortcomings of European Integration
Since the onset of the euro crisis, and possibly in the years before, the EU has
experienced a series of challenges. One of the contemporary shortcomings of the EU lies
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in the creation of the “fortress of Europe”, especially with regards to migration. The EU
is experiencing a crisis at its gates as the plight of refugees intensifies and more and more
migrants try to reach the EU by sea and land in order to apply for asylum. Frontex, the
EU border protection agency, is under heavy criticism for surveillance technologies used
to detect boats with migrants before they enter the territorial waters of member states, and
there have been countless incidents of member states failing to help migrants in distress
at sea.241 2015 saw the influx of over one million migrants into the EU and a total of
942,000 asylum claims made in its member states.242 Despite its relatively high number of
accepted asylum applications, 184,655 in 2014243 compared to 66,986 refugees resettled
into the US in the same year,244 the EU continues to employ strategies to deter refugees
from reaching its territory. Clearly, European states are focusing inward on internal
challenges related to its regionalization rather than outward in this regard, but they need
to take responsibility for what is happening at its borders and act in greater solidarity with
its migrants.
The second contemporary shortcoming relates directly to the refugee crisis:
xenophobia and right wing movements are on the rise in the union’s member states,
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putting in questions the very ideals of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law on
which the EU was founded. Although xenophobic tendencies have existed in Europe
before, the euro crisis and its devastating economic consequences, such as high
unemployment,245 have created an angry class of EU citizens that increasingly opposes
integration and immigration. This is leading to an increased orientation inward and
against all foreign, which is exemplified for instance by the violence against refugee
accommodations and ongoing protests of the Patriotic Europeans Against the
Islamization of the West (Pegida) movement in Germany. Although officially these
protests are directed against the perceived islamization of the West, in practice the
demonstrations have shown a xenophobic, racist, and homophobic tendencies.246
Thirdly, and again in relation to the previous two shortcomings, the EU is not
managing to consolidate heterogenizing pressures from within as both popular and
government support for the EU are falling. The democratic deficit present in the EU has
been criticized for decades, and although efforts have been made to increase the
involvement of EU citizens in EU governance, “the ultimate democratization is presented
as a promise like the light at the end of the tunnel", as Jurgen Habermas had put it.247
Simultaneously, right wing and eurosceptic movements, such as the Alternative for
Germany (AfD) party, the Jobbik party in Hungary, the National Front in France, and the
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Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, are on the rise in many, if not most, member states.
Their success is in many ways boosted by the rising antagonism caused by the refugee
crisis as their antiEuropean plea to close the borders increases their popularity. While
currently eurosceptics define themselves mostly in terms of what they are against and
propose shortsighted policies but fail to articulate solutions to the challenges Europe
faces or what they stand for, the EU must find ways to make itself more attractive to its
citizens if it wants to successfully counteract these trends.

3.5.

Lessons
It appears nearly superfluous to state that the EU and the AU are at very different

stages in the process of regional integration, and that therefore many of their respective
current successes and challenges are particular to the context of their organizational
circumstances. The European Union has achieved almost complete economic and
political integration and must resolve problems that its integration has created, while the
African Union has a multitude of problems to resolve before it can proceed with
meaningful continental integration. Interestingly, the informants I interviewed at the AU
headquarters in Addis almost exclusively also believed that the EU provides valuable
lessons for the future of continental integration in Africa. Although informants
recognized that the EU is experiencing a break in its integration trajectory, one informant
stated that despite the challenges the EU faces, it is not failing in the eyes of AU staff.
Rather, it is seen in Addis Ababa as a peaceful union that speaks with one voice, which
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the AU aspires to become.248 Another informant stressed that in their eyes, the EU was
not

disintegrating

despite the economic crisis and the migrant situation.249

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the EU, and even though the EU and AU are
located on different points of the spectrum from none to complete integration and have
followed divergent paths to arrive there, the European experience has at a minimum five
lessons to offer for those in charge of integration in Africa.
First, several informants have expressed to me that one technical area in which
they believe the AU can learn from the European experience is the implementation of the
principle of the free movement of people. An informant explained that the free movement
of people is not only not implemented for the ordinary citizens of member states in many
regions of the African continent, but that even AU staff cannot necessarily move freely
between African states to pursue their work. While an AU passport that does not require a
visa for travel to member states exists for AUC staff, it was not granted to other
diplomats at the time of interviewing.250 The same informant had to visit an embassy on
the day of the interview to obtain a visa to travel to an AU member state for a meeting the
following morning. In 2015 it was announced that an AU passport would in the future be
available for all AU citizens as a part of Agenda 2063.251
Secondly, another informant praised the European Structural and Investment
Funds, saying that it was an impressive and commendable achievement of the EU that it
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attempts to bring poorer members to the economic level of the union, and that the same is
much needed at the AU.252 A 2013 feasibility study conducted by the UNDP and the AU
examined the possibility of such an African Integration Fund (AIF) and proposed a
timeline according to which it would have commenced in the second quarter of 2015. 253
No proposal for the AIF has been adopted to date. The AIF in contrast to the European
Structural and Investment Fund would not support development initiatives in member
states but the financing of integration itself.
In addition to the above lessons identified by informants in Addis Ababa, further
lessons can be drawn from the comparative study I have provided in this chapter. After
all, even if African integration in practice often follows a different logic than European
integration, the AU aspires to become much like the EU according to the AU staff I
interviewed.
The third lesson thus relates to coping with shocks that rapid integration measures
can create. One informant stated, “sometimes we see the EU and we want to jump
through the steps the EU took between 1960 and now.”254 While this desire to advance
integration quickly is commendable compared to the overwhelming reluctance to
integrate during OAU times, the European experience has shown that expedited measures
can create adverse effects of a magnitude that threatens continental integration as a
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whole. Specifically, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the subsequent accession of the
new members to the Schengen Area have contributed to the rise of antiEuropean
movements in European states. In the case of the AU, of course, it is not enlargement that
could create these shocks, since all African states except for Morocco are member states
at present. This lesson rather applies in the African context to the disruptive effects
inherent in the phase immediately after the implementation of economic integration
measures.
Fourthly, European integration provides valuable lessons relating to popular
participation in the integration process. The threat to the continuation of integration at the
EU from the very citizens of its member states is related directly to the democratic deficit
in the EU, but in two distinct ways. Firstly, the ongoing perceived deficiency of channels
for democratic engagement in the affairs of the EU has contributed to the anger of the
political right. Secondly, because the EP is directly elected and composed of independent
European political parties, such anger has manifested itself in the success of antiEU
political parties in the legislative body of the EU. The AU at present is much less directly
democratic than the EU. In those member states that do have a functioning democratic
political system, citizens may indirectly influence AU policy through electing their
national governments, but such influence is diluted to an extent where it can hardly be
conceptualized as democratic. The AU has important lessons to learn about the
reconfiguration of power from a national to a continental level and the design of
democratic involvement in continental affairs. The AU therefore must ensure the
establishment of means for democratic participation at the continental level by following
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through with the implementation of full legislative powers for and direct elections to the
PAP if it wants to avoid the same popular criticism the EU has received. Yet, the
European experience should also raise caution about the combination of unpopular
policies and directly democratic institutions. Decisionmakers at the AU must decide
when the organization will be ready to transform itself into the democratic PanAfrican
entity it seeks to become and how this will be achieved.
A final lesson, technical and yet important, that the EU has to offer for the AU
relates to the consolidation and regular updating of EU treaties and the resultant legal and
practical simplification of the functioning of the union. As outlined in Chapter 3.3.1, the
first such simplification occurred in 1965, when the Merger Treaty consolidated the
institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom. In a similar vein, the Treaty of Rome that
had established the EEC in 1957 was renumbered and renamed the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (TEC), and subsequently became the TFEU with the coming
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon further transformed the
1992 Treaty of Maastricht into the TEU. The amendments of these two constitutional
documents of the EU were made in the light of the failed TCE and in response to changes
taking place on the European continent. According to the EU law website, “
successive
enlargements have increased the number of EU countries to 28. It was therefore
necessary to adapt the way the European institutions function and how decisions are
taken.”255 The lesson for the AU to be drawn from these processes is bipartite: Firstly, as
the EU evolved and the political context of European relations changed, the EU reformed
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itself to meet the legal and institutional demands of the time. The AU has undergone
similar processes of adaptation since its inception. These include the ongoing talks for
streamlining the AUC mentioned in Chapter 3.3.2, the adoption of the Protocol on
Relations between the RECs and the AU aimed at the clarification of the legal
relationships between the various entities involved in economic integration in Africa, and
the creation of the African Governance Infrastructure (AGA) to foster cooperation among
AU bodies working in the field of governance and democracy, both of which I address in
greater detail in Chapter 4.3. Notwithstanding such existing initiatives to clarify AU law
and optimize the functioning of the AU, there remains a lack of clarity in the legal and
functional framework of the AU. The second part of this lesson the AU can learn from
the EU therefore relates to the need not only to adapt the union to the demands of the
time by creating new legal text, bodies, institutions, and programs, but also to consolidate
and thereby simplify, as much as complex integration schemes permit, the legal
framework and functioning of the AU. Crucially, this would involve the streamlining of
bodies with overlapping mandates as well.
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Chapter 4.
The Achievements and Shortcomings of the African
Union
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4.1.

Introduction
What are the successes and shortcomings of the AU to date and by what standards

can the performance of the PanAfrican organization be evaluated? On the one hand, an
assessment of the milestones of integration reached by the AU as compared to the EU or
other regional organizations involves the risk of dismissing African (and other
nonEuropean) integration regimes as weak or incomplete without a critical examination
of the AU. Through such a Eurocentric lens, one might risk overlooking some
achievements of the AU. Measuring the AU’s achievements by comparing the de jure
nature of integration in Africa with the reality on the ground might similarly lead to an
overly pessimistic outlook on integration in Africa because of the slow implementation of
ambitious AU law. On the other hand, not holding the AU accountable to its goals would
do injustice to the citizens that the organization was created to serve and whose lives
were meant to be improved through integration. With these considerations in mind, this
chapter evaluates what has been achieved at the AU in the fourteen years of its existence
based on its own goals and legal obligations, as well as in comparison to the OAU era.
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4.2.

The Achievements of the African Union
Assessing the performance of an organization as large and complex as the AU is

no easy task, especially given the tendency in the study of regional integration to dismiss
integration regimes that are perceived as weak due to a lack of legally binding
frameworks or a lack of enforcement thereof. This is the case not only with the AU, but,
for instance, with ASEAN as well. With that said, identifying the shortcomings of such
regimes, as I do in the following section, is predominantly an exercise in functionalist
analysis. The achievements of “weak” integration regimes, on the contrary, should not
solely be measured by the extent to which their legal frameworks are implemented or one
might overlook some of the impact these organizations have had. In the case of the AU,
legal and institutional weakness is to a large extent, though not exclusively, caused by
compromised

economic

capacity.

Instead

of

asking

about

completeness

of

implementation and existence and application of legal enforcement mechanisms alone,
one might further like to ask what positive changes the AU has brought about despite low
capacity. In this light, four major achievements of the AU can be identified.
The first achievement of the AU is its strong stance against unconstitutional
changes of government. Since the establishment of the OAU in 1963, there have been 91
successful coups d’état on the African continent.256 One informant stated, “In Africa we
have constitutions without constitutionalism,”257 in reference to the title of the 1988 book
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by H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo. Although the OAU had begun to create a set of policies and
an international legal framework which condemn unconstitutional changes of
government, it was only after the creation of the AU that such condemnation was
routinely put into practice. Previously to the first successful action of the Organization of
African Unity against a coup when Major Paul Koromah's seized power in Sierra Leone
in 1997, attempts by some member states to refuse recognition by the Organization of
African Unity to governments that had come to power by unconstitutional means in
Ghana in 1966, Uganda in 1971, Liberia in 1980, and Chad in 1982 had remained
unsuccessful.258
The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in July 2000, not only revised
the insistence of the Organization of African Unity on the principles of noninterference
and sovereign selfdetermination but furthermore endowed the organization with powers
that exceed those previously possessed by the Organization of African Unity. Thus, while
Article 3.2 of the Organization of African Unity Charter provided for the “sovereign
equality of all member States,”259 and “noninterference in the internal affairs of States,”
260

according to Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, the principles of the African Union

include the “sovereign equality and independence of Member States of the Union,”261 and
“noninterference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.”262 Hence, the
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African Union Constitutive Act leaves the possibility of intervention in the internal
affairs of member states by the union. Article 4 (h) provides for
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity.263

With regards to coups d’état, and contrary to the Organization of African Union Charter,
the Constitutive Act of the African Union moreover provides for the “condemnation and
rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.”264 It further provides for the
suspension of member states in which an unconstitutional change of government occurs
from the African Union in Article 30. The 2000 Lomé Declaration clarifies what
situations the African Union considers unconstitutional changes of government, namely
where a “military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government,”
“intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government,” the
“replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and
rebel movements,” or “the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the
winning party after free, fair and regular elections” occur. The Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of The Peace and Security Council of the African Union regulates the
measures that the African Union can take against countries in which an unconstitutional
change of government has occurred, notably providing the PSC with the power to impose
sanctions on member states in question. Most recently, the 
African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance
, which came into force in 2012 after being
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adopted in 2007, amends the definition of situations of unconstitutional change of
government provided in the Lomé Declaration to include “any amendment or revision of
the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of
democratic change of government.”265 The Charter further bans perpetrators of
unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections once order is
restored,266 and provides that they could be tried before an African Union court.267 It
lastly extends the powers of the Peace and Security Council to act to maintain
constitutional order even before an unconstitutional change of government occurs.268
To date, the African Union has taken action against unconstitutional changes of
government in twelve of its member states, namely Togo in 2005, Mauritania in 2005 and
2008, Guinea in 2008, Madagascar in 2009, Niger in 2010, Ivory Coast in 2010, Guinea
Bissau in 2012, Mali in 2012, Egypt and Libya in 2013, The Central African Republic in
2013, and Burkina Faso in 2015.
The second achievement of the AU likewise relates to promoting stability in
Africa. In comparison with its predecessor, the AU displays a credible commitment to
address peace and security issues on the continent with continental frameworks and,
where necessary, interventions. In addition to fighting the culture of unconstitutional
governance, with the APSA the AU has created a comprehensive set of mechanisms to
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help combat the myriad of conflict, predominantly civil conflict, that has ailed the
continent since the struggle for independence. Considering that many observers, such as
a former OAU official I interviewed, question whether political and economic integration
can progress before peace, stability, and democracy advance across the continent,269 this
is not only commendable in itself but can also be considered a step towards closer
economic and political cooperation in the future. Following the end of the Cold War era,
the role of regional organizations, especially in Africa where intrastate conflict became
the prevalent form of hostilities, in maintaining international peace and security
expanded, as they gradually became more involved in the prevention and management of
international and civil conflict.270 The involvement of the OAU in African conflicts had
been limited by its strict interpretation of the principles of sovereignty and
noninterference in domestic affairs of member states, so that examples of OAU conflict
intervention, such as in Chad, Burundi and the Comoros, are few and their successes
limited.271 Consisting of the PSC, 
the Panel of the Wise, the AU Peace Fund, the
Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force, the APSA is a
manifestation of collective political will to prioritize peace and security over state
sovereignty in accordance with the responsibility to protect principle. APSA, unlike
previous African peace and security initiatives, further has an underlying theoretical
framework that addresses how Africa can be transformed from its current state of conflict
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to a state of peace.272 Besides the willingness of the AU, unlike the OAU, to intervene in
intrastate conflict, such as with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
APSA further provides conflict prevention mechanisms through the Continental Early
Warning System. To date, the PSC has sent or authorized 64,000 peacekeepers to the
many missions across the continent, frequently carried out in cooperation with the UN.273
The third achievement of the AU is its focus on improving governance and
increasing popular participation on the continent through initiatives under the AGA. This
is perhaps the least functionalist item in this assessment because it is not necessarily the
state of its implementation but creation of a normative continental governance framework
that deserves recognition. African states have long been criticized internationally for their
largely poor performance in the areas of democracy, governance, and human rights. The
adoption and coming into force of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance, as well as the establishment of the APRM, the PAP, the ECOSOCC, and the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is to be merged with the ACJ to
create a single African Court of Justice and Human Rights pursuant to decisions of the
Assembly in 2004 and 2005, institutionalize the participatory and democratic vision of
the new PanAfricanists. With this framework, the AU takes a clear stance against the
perpetuation of a culture of impunity and for more democratic politics, better governance,
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increased civil society involvement, and respect for human and peoples’ rights. These
initiatives are not faultless, as the domestication of and adherence to their principles is
making slow progress. While many African states transitioned away from authoritarian
governance, few have reached the status of a full democracy. I discuss the functional
liabilities of the AGA in the following section. Nevertheless, codifying progressive
governance norms brings the AU one step closer to implementing them, which is a
central prerequisite for closer political and economic integration since democracies have
historically engaged more in international cooperation than more autocratic states.
A fourth achievement of the AU is its ability, remarkable when compared with the
OAU, to assemble representatives from member states and prompt them to take speedy
decisions on pressing issues. One AU staff said, “the AU derives its importance from its
convenient power. It assembles leaders and places an issue before them and forces them
to address it.”274 Permanent AU staff, especially of the AUC, thus has the ability to
enhance and influence cooperation and integration despite the AU’s predominantly
intergovernmental nature. The informant added, “any issue you can bring before them,
place on their agenda, the convenient power has an advantage.”275 As a predominantly
optimistic and progressive entity, the AUC in this way can influence the direction of
conversation of African leaders during AU summits and meetings, and place
controversial issues on the table. The optimism of AU staff, although genuine in my
experience, of course stems in part from the fact that they are not the ones tasked with
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implementing ambitious AU programs, as another informant pointed out. The AU has in
this way nevertheless managed to speedily and effectively address some of the crises that
the African continent faced during its existence, as is evidenced by its successful
response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa that began in 2013.

4.3.

The Shortcomings of the African Union
Despite the achievements of the AU, the PanAfrican organization is not without

its limitations, three of which I identify in this section.. The first shortcoming of African
integration at the AU lies in the frequently slow, incomplete, or even lacking
implementation of AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, and Charters. This problem
begins in many instances with a slow process of the signing of documents by member
states and a relatively long period of time after the adoption of a document for a sufficient
number of member states to ratify the latter for its entry into force. For instance, the
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union was adopted on July 1, 2003, but
entered into force only six year later on February 11, 2009.276 Other documents have not
entered into force at all, such as the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of
the African Union and the Protocol to the OAU Convention on Preventing and
Combatting Terrorism, which were adopted in 2003 and 2004.277
The AU and RECs either lack effective schemes for the enforcement of the
implementation of agreements, or, where such schemes exist, they are not invoked on a
regular basis. The lack of implementation, however, is not solely rooted in the
276
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unwillingness of political leadership to relinquish sovereignty, implement treaties,
charters and conventions, and liberalize their respective economies. Many AU member
states are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and practice protectionism not
least to grow and diversify their domestic economies before liberalization. The principle
of variable geometry thus is a key reason for the flexibility in the implementation of
African integration agreements. An important additional reason for the failure of African
RECs and the AEC to establish a legally binding and consistently enforced framework
for international integration, especially economic integration, like that of the European
Union, is the cost associated with the liberalization of economies and the judicial reform
that integration agreements, whether economic or political, entail. Even where the
willingness to liberalize and utilize the economic benefits of greater liberalization or to
implement political integration documents exists, African states often lack the revenues
to put aspirations into practice. This includes not only a loss of revenue from the
elimination of customs duties in free trade areas and costs related to steps such as
implementing common tariff classification systems in the case of economic integration,
but also the costs associated with executing changes in the domestic legislature to
domesticate international agreements. These factors might help explain why legal
documents that are adopted at the AU are not necessarily ratified speedily or
implemented fully and in a timely manner in the member states.
In the light of these challenges to African economic integration, the question
arises whether the stage approach to economic and political integration set out in the
Abuja Treaty may be overly ambitious, and the RECs should completely implement their
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respective free trade areas and customs unions before negotiating agreements among each
other; or whether greater legal harmonization will ease future implementation of
economic integration on the continent. The COMESA, the EAC, and the SADC have met
the objective set out in the Abuja Treaty to merge RECs, but other RECs are not likely to
meet this target any time soon. On the question of the meeting of deadlines, an AU staff
member said, “deadlines are there. In 2017 we have to achieve the common African Free
Trade Area. But as I said, I don’t think Central Africa will be able to achieve it.”278
In a similar vein, the question arises whether legal documents not relating to the
African Economic Community, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance, should be less ambitious in character and more strictly enforced, or whether
these documents function as a progressive normative framework that will create the
desired political change over time. The danger of such an approach, of course, is that
citizens and politicians alike might stop taking AU law seriously if there are no
repercussions for a member state’s failure to implement it. Someone at the AU
headquarters commented on this challenge,
The AU cannot prescribe what kind of political and economic system a country
adopts, but the AU asks that if a country ratifies an instrument, it implements it
within its political and constitutional context.279

At the same time, another informant admitted, “There is nothing ideal, and there
is nothing that is implemented one hundred per cent.”280
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A second shortcoming of the AU is its inherent lack of legal and functional
clarity. In terms of legal clarity, the status of the RECs within the AEC, as well as that of
the AEC within the AU is not well defined. Since these are separate legal entities, their
precise legal relationships to each other should be established by legal agreements, which
has not fully occurred but the AU Constitutive Act does establish the AEC as an integral
part of the AU.281 Legally, this is odd since through being a member state of AMU,
Morocco thus is a part of the AEC, but the AU Constitutive Act was adopted by the AU,
of which Morocco is not a member state. The conflation in practice of the separate legal
entities that are the AEC and AU would thus eventually have as a consequence the de
facto membership of Morocco in the AU once a PanAfrican economic and monetary
union is implemented under the AEC framework for economic integration. There does
exist the Protocol on Relations Between the RECs and the AU, but it does not actually
address the question of legal status of the RECs and their relationship to the AEC and
AU, that is whether they are members, organs, subjects or agents of the AEC or AU, so
that it is difficult to formally establish that they are subject to the decisions of the AEC
and AU.282 It has been argued by scholars such as Richard Oppong that this legal
flexibility inherent in the African continental and regional schemes for integration is a
major obstacle to its success. Oppong argues that while a strong and binding legal
framework is not a sufficient condition for successful integration, it is a necessary
condition for the latter. 283 The arguably most important obstacle that arises out of

Oppong, 
Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa, 
70.
Ibid, 71.
283
Ibid, 31.
281
282

106

flexibility and multiple membership in African economic integration communities is the
degree of ambiguity of existing legal frameworks. It is, for instance, legally impossible
to be part of two customs unions and implement two separate common external tariffs at
once, a problem Kenya and Uganda were faced with as members of both the EAC and the
COMESA prior to the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. Other African
states continue to face this problem.
African integration today faces not only such legal ambiguity, but also the
challenge of vague and overlapping responsibilities of the organs that compose the AU,
AEC, and RECs, as well as competing competence with the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) and a dichotomy between the work of permanent staff
and the representatives of member states. With regards to the former, a multitude of
organs and initiatives has been established since the AU came into being that often have
similar or overlapping objectives and responsibilities. While there are attempts at
simplifying this, such as the African Governance Architecture (AGA) which creates
dialogue between different political organs and initiatives, such initiatives have often
added more tasks and costs to African integration than they have eliminated, so that the
overall landscape of AU initiatives remains confusingly plentiful.
The relationship between the work of the AU and the UNECA is not always clear
in practice either. Formally, the UNECA is meant to act as a kind of think tank for the
mandate of the AU, yet in practice the UNECA frequently is engaged in tasks that one
should think lie with the AU. The two organizations frequently act as partners in
implementing projects, collecting intelligence, and publishing reports. Nevertheless, as a
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diplomat working for an embassy in Addis Ababa has pointed out to me, there appears to
be a competitiveness for responsibility between the AU and UNECA. The UNECA, on
the one hand, credits the lack of capacity of the AU with its own increased involvement.
Others, on the other hand, see this increased involvement as undermining the credibility
of the AU as an organization that aims at decreasing the dependence of African states.284
A third weakness of African integration and one that has outlived the OAU era to
an extent is the reluctance of African leaders to pool sovereignty to achieve the objectives
of integration. To AU staff, continental unity appears central to the transformation to
greater selfsufficiency and heightened influence in global governance of the continent.
Someone at the AU headquarters stated, “together we will win. Alone we will lose.”285
Such unity does not, however, exist between African states in many policy areas. One
informant explained, “Conversation is ongoing and fruitful in some areas but difficult in
others. While the EU can speak with one voice, at the AU it’s more difficult.”286 For unity
to be institutionalized, the implementation of existing agreements, as well as continued
harmonization, and eventual unification, of national policies at the PanAfrican level is
necessary. Yet, as one informant at the AU headquarters contended, “there still is
discussion if political integration should be gradual or revolutionary, as Nkrumah wanted
it, as Gaddafi wanted it.”287
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The scope and intensity of international cooperation between African states has
increased with the dismantling of authoritarian regimes and the advance of democracy on
the continent. Despite this paradigm shift regarding the norms of sovereignty and
noninterference that accompanied the transition from the OAU to the AU, however, the
AU has thus far remained an intergovernmental organization despite ambitions to form a
union of states.288 There are several reasons for why this is the case in addition to the
aforementioned disagreement between African leaders about whether integration should
be gradual or revolutionary. Firstly, African states have fought hard for their
independence and sovereign selfdetermination, and are consequently often reluctant to
give it up. Indeed, research has found a correlation between leaders of the independence
movement being in power and African states’ willingness to cede sovereignty to the AU
or the RECs they are members of.289 In many African states, this remains the case. In
Zimbabwe, for instance, Robert Mugabe has held on to power since 1980. Secondly,
some scholars have advanced the argument that the vast social, cultural, political and
economic heterogeneity of the African continent complicates attempts at pooling
sovereignty.290 Lastly, AU member states appear to be politically and economically
oriented toward their RECs and the world at large much more so than toward the African
continent. With their main focus on integration not lying with the AU, it appears logical
that they would hesitate to cede sovereignty to the continental organization.
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Conclusion
What Future for African Integration?
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
What does the future hold for the AU in particular, and African integration in
general? This study has established that in the fourteen years of its existence, the AU has
begun to institutionalize a paradigm shift with regards to development, democracy, and
governance. A new generation of African leaders reinvigorated the philosophy of
PanAfricanism and stressed not only the importance of placing the African continent in a
more beneficial position on the global playing field by combatting the effects of
colonialism and imperialism, but additionally the need for scrutinizing domestic
governance. The AU has created an ambitious vision for a united, stable, and more
prosperous continent characterized by good governance. The most prominent obstacles to
African unity through integration are the slow progress of implementation of
international agreements, the lack of clarity with regards to the legal relationship between
the AU and the RECs and the relationship of the RECs with one another, the varying
levels of economic development among member states of the AEC, and finally, the
distaste for the relinquishing of power to supranational institutions that enforce treaty
implementation. Despite its achievements in the areas of peace and security, stability, and
governance, the AU has not been able to increase the influence of the continent in global
affairs significantly, and the AU is not yet integrated enough to be able to speak with one
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voice internationally, as member states are frequently oriented more towards international
partners or the RECs that they participate in.
Globalization today could become an opportunity as opposed to a misfortune for
the continent, as a billion consumers, driven by the cheetah generation and emerging
middle classes, are taking increased economic and entrepreneurial leadership. One
informant stated,
the main driver of interaction on the continent is not the AU but young people.
They see the AU cannot get them to where they want to go, so they are doing it
themselves through channels such as social media.291

According to the World Bank, doing business on the continent today is easier than it has
ever been before,292 not least because of the strengthening of the rule of law and
improvement of

economic governance in many member states since the political

transitions of the 1990s and the transformation of the OAU into the AU. With its
abundant natural resources, some of the youngest populations, and some of the fastest
growing economies in the world, Africa’s potential for development is apparent.
Nevertheless, numerous African countries repeatedly rank among the lowest in the world
in income per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI), and indicators of the quality
of governance and democracy. Corruption, capital flight, and conflict persist as major
obstacles to prosperity despite regional and continental initiatives to fight them. African
countries today trade more with the outside world than within the region, whereby
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especially commodity exporters have little chance for intraregional trade, and
significant barriers to the free movement of goods and people mean that it is easier today
for a British tourist to obtain a visa for Namibia than it is for a Nigerian national, and
easier to import a Belgian car to Burundi than a South African one.293 Opportunities are
abundant, but the AU and its member states must ensure that they create a context in
which they can be exploited.
The AU proclaimed 2013 the Year of PanAfricanism, during which it published
a vision for the transformation of the African continent in the fifty years until 2063.
According to the AUC, Agenda 2063 is at once a declaration of aspirations and an
ambitious plan of action. It articulates the following seven aspirations to be implemented
by 2063:
● A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development294
● An integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism
and the vision of Africa’s renaissance295
● An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and
the rule of law296
● A peaceful and secure Africa297
● An Africa with strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics298
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● An Africa where development is peopledriven, unleashing the potential of its
women and youth299
● Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner 300

Similarly to existing AU frameworks, Agenda 2063 is vastly ambitious and acts more as
a general blueprint than a concrete plan of action. It is now time that less enthusiastic
member states overcome the unwillingness to address domestic ills so that the
commendable vision and guiding principles of the AU, the RECs, and the AEC can be
more tangibly put it to practice across the continent than has been the case to date. The
way forward should therefore not be defined by the abandonment of the idea of African
emancipation through African solutions to African problems, but capacity building in
order to ensure that weaker member states catch up to more successful African states,
such as Ghana, Senegal, and Botswana.
Two prerequisites to achieving the vision enshrined in Agenda 2063 are more
participatory African politics domestically and at the continental level, as well as
visionary leadership that works toward their countries’ transformation and by implication
the transformation of the continent. Firstly, despite the ECOSOCC and PAP, the AU is
not universally wellknown among Africans. Nearly all informants in Addis Ababa have
addressed this topic during my interviews. One informant stated,
there is the need to make people believe in our organization and the need for
economic integration. There must be flagship programs with effects on the
population, otherwise people won’t believe in economic integration in Africa.301
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Another informant spoke about how even in Addis Ababa, where the AU Headquarters
are located, the organization is not wellknown. They stated,
the biggest risk now with the African Union is that if I ask someone to take me
from my house to the AU, after a few minutes they will ask: OAU?302

The AU was created to transform African integration from an intergovernmental “talking
shop” into a regime that serves the needs of the citizens of its member states. Although
high levels of technical expertise are necessary to achieve this goal, and topdown policy
is thus justified, the AU cannot ignore the people it was created to serve, or else it risks
the rise of similar popular criticism that the EU has had to face.
Secondly, strong and visionary leadership has had a special place in the
accomplishments of African success stories such as Botswana. Comparatively weak
institutions, missing checks and balances, and relatively undeveloped democratic political
cultures mean that in Africa, leaders are more powerful than their counterparts elsewhere.
Seen as a curse in the past, this could, paired with the right leaders, be a blessing in
disguise for the fight against the prevailing problems on the continent. Although such a
commitment to transformative leadership is apparent among the permanent staff of the
AU, the predominantly intergovernmental nature of the organization has as a
consequence that national leadership determines the seriousness with which continental
policy is domesticated. Visionary leaders who think in the longterm and are committed
to taking measures against the kinds of threats to an African transformation, such as
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corruption, that prevail on the continent could indeed place their countries on a trajectory
to improved governance, accelerated development, and a commitment to continental
unity. Moreover, a third kind of visionary leadership would aid the effort to achieve the
mission of the AU. In addition to progressive AU staff and transformative national
leaders, there is a need for public leaders to endorse and advocate for African integration.
At the time leading up to the establishment of the OAU and during its existence,
numerous public figures and public intellectuals tasked themselves with advancing the
cause of African unity in international relations, as well as local and global public
opinion. These leaders, who included Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie, and Julius
Nyerere, made African integration efforts known at home and abroad. While in the
decade leading up to the supersession of the OAU by the AU, the advocates for an
African renaissance did publicly advocate for African solidarity and unity, these public
voices have become somewhat more silent since. Muammar Gaddafi and Thabo Mbeki,
arguably the two most prominent advocates for African integration in the AU era, have
not become as universally known as advocates for integration as the earlier generation of
PanAfricanists. This is especially true with regards to making African integration known
to African people. More participatory continental politics, however, depend also on the
existence of public leaders who can make a convincing case for the AU among the
citizens of is member states.
African integration has the potential externally to increase the continent’s
bargaining power in global affairs. Internally, a reconfiguration of power between the
national and the continental level could help to productively accommodate Africa’s
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diversity and leave behind the perils of nationstatism that had characterized the OAU
era. At independence, decolonization proceeded without a questioning of Westphalian
sovereignty, so that out of the three options for political organization at independence,
namely states based on the precolonial ethnic makeup of the continent, an adoption of
the colonial map, and a PanAfrican federation, the colonial template was adopted.303
In conclusion, then, the AU could bring the continent a step closer to the early
PanAfrican ideal of an African federation that utilizes integration to benefit its citizens.
Integration would not, however, imply a disappearance of member states but rather
involves a reconfiguration of power on the continent so that the development of the
continent will have a center of gravity in Addis Ababa. Viable states at a local level
would thus take cues from a new center of African capacity at the AU. These states will
remain, as in the EU, the primary point of democratic involvement of citizens, and
involvement of civil society at the PanAfrican level thus has to be designed with a level
of ingenuity to ensure sufficient representation in continental decisionmaking processes.
Otherwise, the AU might begin to experience similarly low levels of popular support as
the EU, where, quite opposite to the AU, the function of the organization is stronger than
its current vision. Despite its functional problems that delay implementation, the legal
and institutional framework of the AU displays a strong commitment to integration,
democracy, and development. The way to the fulfilment of its vision remains long, but
the AU has laid the headstone to materialize it.
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